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INTRODUCTION
In 1980, the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission1 announced a four-part test to determine the
constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest
is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest.2

Since then, the test has been scorned by scholars from divergent
perspectives,3 questioned by individual Justices,4 and applied by the Court
with fluctuating degrees of stringency and laxity.5 However, despite such
criticism and volatility, Central Hudson remains widely recognized as the
standard governing limitation6 on commercial speech.
This Article examines the persistence of the Central Hudson standard
in the face of multiple challenges as well as larger implications of its
survival. Part I provides a brief overview of the Court’s commercial
speech doctrine and the spectrum of criticism of Central Hudson for its
allegedly excessive or inadequate protection of expression. Part II surveys
a series of developments, especially in the last decade, that threaten to
supersede Central Hudson’s “intermediate” standard of scrutiny7 for
commercial speech restrictions. In response, Part III explains how none of
these phenomena have resulted in the abandonment of the Central Hudson
regime. Notably, lower courts have devised a variety of strategies for
avoiding constructions of Supreme Court decisions that would overthrow
Central Hudson. The Article concludes that Central Hudson’s longevity
represents more than judicial inertia, a doctrinal quirk, or a meaningless
framework. Rather, the standard has served to maintain a degree of
stability in an area that has witnessed shifting ideological predilections. In
this respect, it is like other important criteria and concepts whose evolving
interpretations have not defeated their legitimacy.
1. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
2. Id. at 566.
3. See infra Section I.B.
4. See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Section I.A.
6. This Article does not analyze the Court’s treatment of compelled commercial speech except
insofar as the decision in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361
(2018), may have implications for restraints on commercial speech under Central Hudson.
7. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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I. THE SUPREME COURT AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The Central Hudson framework was articulated early in commercial
speech jurisprudence that dawned with the Court’s ruling in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.8 The
course of that jurisprudence can hardly be characterized as unwavering.
Still, it has been the scope of the Court’s protection, rather than its
inconsistency, that has most aroused the skepticism of critics.
A. Modern Doctrine: From Virginia State Board to Sorrell9
1. Pre-Central Hudson Jurisprudence
Virginia State Board marked the Court’s formal acknowledgement
of commercial speech as a class of expression worthy of First Amendment
protection.10 There, the Court struck down a Virginia law banning
pharmaceutical price advertising as unprofessional conduct.11 Far from
lying outside the purview of the First Amendment, speech that does “no
more than propose a commercial transaction”12 was found to implicate a
number of rationales for safeguarding expression. In this instance, the
ability of those with sparse resources to reduce expenses on prescription
drug prices would promote self-realization13 through “the alleviation of
8. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 428 U.S. 748 (1976).
9. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011); see infra notes 101–13 and accompanying
text.
10. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Court declared “purely commercial
advertising” beyond the aegis of the First Amendment. Id. at 54. A year before Virginia State Board,
the Court retreated somewhat from this principle by denying that Chrestensen reflected “any sweeping
proposition that advertising is unprotected per se.” Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 (1975).
However, the Court’s emphasis on noncommercial interests touched by the advertisement in question,
see id. at 822, left the opinion far from full-throated championship of robust constitutional protection
for commercial speech.
11. Va. State Bd., 428 U.S. at 749–50, 773.
12. Id. at 762 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The question of defining commercial
speech for constitutional purposes is discussed at infra notes 316–24 and accompanying text.
13. Promotion of self-realization or autonomy is often cited as one of the principal goals of the
First Amendment’s protection of freedom of speech. E.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 991–92 (1978) (“To justify legal obligation,
the community must respect individuals as equal, rational[,] and autonomous moral beings . . . . This
requires that people’s choices, their definition and development of themselves, must be respected . . . .
This respect for defining, developing[,] or expressing one’s self is . . . self-realization.”); Thomas I.
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879 (1963) (“The
achievement of self-realization commences with development of the mind . . . . From this it follows
that every [person]—in the development of [their] own personality—has the right to form [their] own
beliefs and opinions. And, it also follows, that [they have] the right to express these beliefs and
opinions.”); Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 244–45 (1998)
(“[T]he fundamental, positive value of the constitutional free speech guarantee is furtherance of
individual self-realization, a broad value that includes (1) the individual’s development of [their]
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physical pain or the enjoyment of basic necessities.”14 Moreover,
communication of prices and other commercial information—ostensibly a
mere pecuniary matter—advances the First Amendment’s paramount aim
of protecting speech relevant to self-government by helping citizens make
informed decisions about regulation of the nation’s predominantly freemarket economy.15 Finally, the Court invoked the First Amendment’s
fundamental premise that unfettered expression is the most effective
means of pursuing truth.16 Virginia had feared that open advertising would
degrade the pharmaceutical profession: consumers would choose
pharmacists based on price rather than quality, ruin the pharmacistcustomer relationship in their constant pursuit of discounts, and lose
respect for a profession they would now regard as “that of a mere
retailer.”17 Though not wholly discrediting these fears, the Court deemed
such justifications for suppression as rooted in the “advantages of
[citizens] being kept in ignorance.”18 The First Amendment forbade “this
highly paternalistic approach”;19 instead, it enforced the belief that “the
dangers of suppressing information” exceed “the dangers of its misuse if
it is freely available.”20
The theme of antipaternalism is featured prominently in the Court’s
treatment of commercial speech regulation in the wake of Virginia State
personal powers and abilities and (2) the individual’s ability and opportunity to make all levels of lifeaffecting decisions, thereby controlling and determining [their] life’s course.”).
14. Va. State Bd., 428 U.S. at 764.
15. Id. at 765 (citing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948)). Meiklejohn’s thesis that expression pertaining to self-government lies at the
heart of the First Amendment has been repeatedly endorsed by the Court. See, e.g., Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than selfexpression; it is the essence of self-government.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per
curiam) (stating that the First Amendment gives broadest protection to “[d]iscussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates[, which] are integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution”); Nat’l Rev., Inc. v. Mann, 140 S. Ct. 344, 347 (2019)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“To ensure that our democracy is preserved and is permitted to flourish, this
Court must closely scrutinize any restrictions on the statements that can be made on important public
policy issues.”). See generally James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011) (contending that theories of
participatory democracy best explain the Court’s contemporary free speech doctrine).
16. See Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 765. This rationale is famously associated with Justice
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). See id. at 630 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . [and] the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”); see also
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”).
17. Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 768–70.
18. Id. at 769.
19. Id. at 770.
20. Id.
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Board. A year later, the Court struck down two bans on commercial speech
that authorities feared would trigger harmful conduct by its recipients.
In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, the Court
invalidated an ordinance barring display of “For Sale” or “Sold” signs.21
The ban was adopted to “stem . . . the flight of white homeowners from a
racially integrated community.”22 As in Virginia State Board, it was not
the goal—here, the “important governmental objective” of maintaining
residential integration—to which the Court objected.23 Rather, the town
had impermissibly proscribed specific content in signs out of fear that such
signs would “cause those receiving the information to act upon it.”24
Additionally, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,25 the Court rejected a state’s
attempt to suppress lawyers’ advertising of the price of routine legal
services.26 Like the state in Virginia State Board, the State Bar of Arizona
contended that individuals seeking services were incapable of properly
assessing and acting upon the information being offered.27 Pointing to its
reasoning in Virginia State Board, the Court expressed wariness of
justifications “based on the benefits of public ignorance.”28 Rather, the
First Amendment contemplates a citizenry with sufficient intelligence and
judgment to be trusted with truthful information.29
21. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1977).
22. Id. at 86.
23. Id. at 95.
24. Id. at 94.
25. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
26. Id. at 384.
27. See id. at 372–75. As an example, the State Bar argued that advertising would distract clients
from attorneys’ skill by “highlight[ing] irrelevant factors,” and variations in providing services
precluded accurate comparisons based on advertisements. Id. at 372.
28. Id. at 375 (citing Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 769–70).
29. See id. at 374–75. Bates unleashed a wave of successful challenges to various state
restrictions on lawyer advertising. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626
(1985) (striking down categorical prohibition of illustrations in advertisements and selfrecommendation to persons who had not sought a lawyer’s legal advice); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n,
486 U.S. 466 (1988) (overturning a blanket ban on targeted direct-mail solicitation); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982) (invalidating bans on description of attorneys’ areas of practice other than in officially
prescribed verbiage and on mailing professional announcement cards to anyone outside certain
categories); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t. of Bus. & Prof’l Regul., Bd. of Acct., 512 U.S. 136 (1994)
(invalidating the State’s sanction against an attorney for advertising herself as a Certified Public
Accountant (CPA) when she was licensed as such by the State and as a Certified Financial Planner
where a national organization authorized her to use this designation); Peel v. Att’y Registration &
Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (majority of Justices expressing approval of First
Amendment protection for letterhead stating attorney’s certification by well-known organization
where accompanied by an appropriate disclaimer); cf. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765
(1993) (striking down a ban on in-person solicitations by CPAs). But see Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,
515 U.S. 618 (1995) (sustaining ban on targeted direct-mail solicitations by personal injury lawyers
within thirty days of an accident); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978)
(upholding enforcement of prohibition on in-person solicitation of clients “for pecuniary gain, under
circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent.”). Both Ohralik and Went
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Alternatively, the Court upheld two restrictions on commercial
advertisement or solicitation in the years leading up to Central Hudson. In
these cases, however, the government sought to prevent overbearing
methods30 or potential misrepresentation, rather than to shield presumably
naïve consumers from accurate information.31
2. Central Hudson
In Central Hudson itself, the context of the Court’s promulgation of
its enduring test was a challenge to a state’s complete ban on promotional
advertising by a utility.32 There, the Court systematically applied its newly
minted standard requiring that the speech at issue is protected by the First
Amendment, the regulation seeks to promote a substantial interest, the
regulation in fact “directly advances” that issue, and the restriction does
not impinge on more expression than is necessary to serve the interest.33
As a threshold matter under the first prong, the Court determined that the
advertising at issue was entitled to First Amendment recognition because
it was neither misleading nor related to illegal activity.34 Under the
standard’s second and third prongs , the Court was satisfied that the Public
Service Commission’s policy “directly advanced” the state’s “substantial”
interest in energy conservation.35 However, the “complete suppression” of
the utility’s advertising foundered on the final step, as it was held
“more extensive than necessary” to further this interest.36 The wholesale
ban prevented the utility from advertising more energy-efficient devices,
and the state had failed to show that less intrusive measures—e.g.,
requiring that advertisements note the relative efficiency of services they
promote—would not serve the state’s interest.37 At the same time, the
Court cautioned that its ruling did not represent the elevation of
commercial speech to the realm of fully protected expression; on the
For It can be viewed as recognizing state authority to curb attorneys’ exercise of undue influence and
other abusive behavior rather than repudiating the antipaternalistic thrust of the Court’s decisions in
this area. See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 630 (emphasizing the State’s goal of protecting “bereaved or
injured individuals” from a “willful or knowing affront to or invasion of [their] tranquility”); Ohralik,
436 U.S. at 464 (finding circumstances present—where attorney had personally solicited two young
accident victims, including one in traction in a hospital bed, and sought to use secret recordings of
conversations with them to enforce representation agreement—”inherently conducive to overreaching
and other forms of misconduct”).
30. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 447, discussed in supra note 29.
31. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12–15 (1979) (upholding ban on practice of optometry
under a trade name as means of preventing misleading impression of practice’s character).
32. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 558 (1980).
33. Id. at 566.
34. See id. at 566–68.
35. Id. at 568–69.
36. Id. at 569–71.
37. Id. at 570–71.
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contrary, commercial speech was entitled to “lesser protection” under the
Constitution.38 The Court later explained that commercial speakers’
familiarity with their markets and products, as well as commercial
speech’s hardiness born of economic self-interest, allowed regulation of
content forbidden in other types of expression.39
3. Post-Central Hudson Jurisprudence
In the fifteen years following Central Hudson, the Court’s approach
fluctuated between searching inspection of restrictions on commercial
speech and deference to regulation in light of the “subordinate position of
commercial speech in the scale of First Amendment values.”40 In two
cases, the Court refused to sustain restrictions based on justifications
unrelated to reasons for affording the government greater latitude to
regulate commercial speech. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,
the Court struck down a ban on mailing unsolicited advertisements for
contraceptives.41 The Court found the state’s argument that recipients
would find such material offensive as unavailing here as in a
noncommercial setting.42 Similarly rejected was the putative “low value”
of commercial speech as grounds for discriminatory restrictions on
newsracks distributing “commercial” publications in City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc.43 Because Cincinnati asserted interests in safety
and aesthetics applied identically—and on a greater scale—to the City’s
numerous newsracks purveying non-commercial publications, the City
had failed to cite distinctly “commercial harms” that would justify the
disparate treatment.44
Other rulings underscored the vigor with which the Court could
infuse Central Hudson’s requirement that limitations on commercial
speech be no “more extensive than is necessary to serve [the
government’s] interest.”45 For example, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
the Court invalidated a federal ban on the disclosure of alcohol content of

38. Id. at 562–63.
39. Id. at 564 n.6.
40. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 430 (1993).
41. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73–75 (1983).
42. Id. at 71–72.
43. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993).
44. See id. at 417–18, 425–26. The Court distinguished its earlier holding in Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), sustaining a ban on advertising billboards except those on the
premises of the billboard’s sponsor. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 425 n.20. Unlike Cincinnati’s
restriction of newsracks dispensing “commercial handbills,” id. at 428, San Diego’s prohibition was
deemed to involve different treatment of two kinds of commercial speech rather than categorical
discrimination against commercial speech. Id. at 425 n.20.
45. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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beer on labels or in advertising.46 The government justified the restriction
as a means of discouraging “strength wars” that spurred beer companies
to raise the alcoholic content of their products.47 Even assuming that the
ban directly advanced this interest as required by Central Hudson’s third
prong,48 it failed the test’s fourth prong—that a regulation be “[no] more
extensive than is necessary”—because the government could apparently
promote its interest through methods less invasive on speech.49 As one
alternative, the government might directly limit the alcohol content of
beer.50
During this same period, however, the Court also sustained a number
of restrictions that may well not have survived the relatively exacting
scrutiny in Rubin. Granted, some of these rulings might be construed as
presenting special circumstances rather than intimating a more permissive
review. One example is when the Court in San Francisco Arts & Athletics,
Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee51 upheld the Olympic
Committee’s enforcement of its exclusive statutory right to use the word
“Olympic” to prevent promotion of an athletic competition called the “Gay
Olympic Games.”52 Though curtailing speech, the ruling can be
characterized as the protection of intellectual property.53 The Court’s
decision in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.54 presented an even narrower
situation and approved a ban on targeted direct-mail solicitations by
personal injury lawyers within thirty days of an accident.55 The Court
viewed the prohibition as mainly aimed to guard the fragile emotional
wellbeing of “bereaved or injured individuals.”56 In noting the limitation
of its holding to “the circumstances presented here,”57 the Court appeared
to confirm that it intended no departure from the antipaternalistic impulse

46. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995).
47. Id. at 479.
48. The Court expressed doubt that the prohibition actually met this third prong of Central
Hudson. See id. at 491.
49. Id. at 490–91.
50. Id. at 490. An insistence that regulations not excessively limit commercial speech also
marked decisions invalidating restrictions on lawyer advertising. See discussion at supra note 29.
51. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
52. Id. at 525–27, 548.
53. See Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation
and Other Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401,
417–18 (1998) (citing S.F. Arts, 483 U.S. at 541) (“[T]he First Amendment does not protect any right
to misappropriate valuable commercial property, even if the property can be characterized
as speech.”).
54. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
55. Id. at 620.
56. Id. at 630.
57. Id. at 620.

2021]

Stubborn Survival of the Central Hudson Test

655

behind its previous rulings on state attempts to restrict truthful
solicitation.58
However, in other cases, the Court articulated a broader approach
reflecting a less potent version of Central Hudson’s final step. Most
explicit on this score was the Central Hudson Court’s reformulation of the
requirement that restrictions on commercial speech be “no[] more
extensive than is necessary to serve [the state’s] interest.”59 Restraints on
noncommercial speech subjected to this kind of standard must typically
endure a stringent level of scrutiny.60 And yet, in Board of Trustees of the
State University of New York v. Fox,61 the Court dismissed the notion that
Central Hudson had imposed a “least-restrictive-means” test.62 Rather, the
Fox Court interpreted Central Hudson’s fourth prong as requiring a less
demanding “‘fit between the legislature’s ends and . . . means’ . . . that is
not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest
served.’”63
Even more corrosive to the Central Hudson test was the Court’s
reasoning in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico, which produced a relatively lenient interpretation of this
requirement. 64 There, the Court allowed Puerto Rico to forbid
advertising for casino gambling directed at Puerto Rican residents even as
the territory declined to outlaw such gambling.65 In part, the Court
undermined Central Hudson’s antipaternalistic premise by approving the
ban’s rationale that though residents were “already aware of the risks of
casino gambling,” they would “nevertheless be induced by
widespread advertising to engage in such potentially harmful conduct.”66
58. See supra notes 21–31 and accompanying text.
59. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
60. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) (“[E]ven though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.”);
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) (citation omitted) (“In past cases
evaluating injunctions restricting speech, we have . . . [sought] to ensure that the injunction was no
broader than necessary to achieve its desired goals.”); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1973)
(citations omitted) (“[A] significant encroachment upon associational freedom cannot be justified
upon a mere showing of a legitimate state interest . . . . If the State has open to it a less drastic way of
satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative scheme that broadly stifles the
exercise of fundamental personal liberties.”).
61. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
62. Id. at 476–81.
63. Id. at 480 (citations omitted).
64. Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), abrogated by 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
65. See id. at 331–32 (noting Puerto Rico’s legalization of some forms of casino gambling).
66. Id. at 344.
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Still more threatening to protection of commercial speech, however, was
the Court’s assertion that the government’s “greater power to . . . ban
casino gambling” altogether must entail the “less intrusive step” of
confining its prohibition to advertising of the activity.67 Writ large, this
logic would license the government to restrict advertising of any activity
or product that did not enjoy constitutional immunity.68
The more permissive stance toward limits on commercial speech
signaled by Fox and Posadas appeared to gain purchase in United States
v. Edge Broadcasting Co.69 Edge sustained a federal ban on lottery
advertisements by broadcasters licensed in states that did not conduct
lotteries.70 For the Court, enforcement qualified as a reasonable fit under
Fox between the restriction and the goal of bolstering non-lottery states’
efforts to discourage participation in lotteries.71 The pliability of the
required relationship between means and end was underlined by the fact
that the vast majority of Edge’s audience resided in a neighboring state
that sponsored a lottery.72 Likewise, the Court found Posadas apposite.73
Here, as in Posadas, the Court acknowledged the government’s rationale
that advertising of gambling stimulates the demand for it.74 Moreover, the
Court reaffirmed Posadas’s greater-includes-the-lesser assumption that
gambling’s lack of constitutional protection afforded the government
ample latitude to restrict advertising about it.75
In retrospect, the tolerance of restraints on commercial speech found
in rulings like Edge represents detours rather than harbingers of a wider
deferential approach. Indeed, a majority of Justices in 44 Liquormart, Inc.
v. Rhode Island76 either questioned77 or disavowed78 Posadas’s continued
vitality.79 Though no opinion spoke for the Court, all endorsed invalidation
of Rhode Island’s ban on advertising retail liquor prices except at the place
of sale.80 Writing for four Justices, Justice Stevens believed that this
67. Id. at 345–46.
68. See id. at 345 (distinguishing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 700–02
(1977) (contraceptives); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818–29 (1975) (abortions)).
69. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429 (1993).
70. Id. at 418, 436.
71. Id. at 429–30.
72. See id. at 423–24.
73. Id. at 434.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 426.
76. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
77. See id. at 531–32 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
78. See id. at 509–11 (Stevens, J., plurality).
79. See Arlen W. Langvardt & Eric L. Richards, The Death of Posadas and the Birth of Change
in Commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44 Liquormart, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 483, 485 (1997) (44
Liquormart “sound[ed] . . . the death knell for Posadas and its modes of analysis”).
80. See 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 484–85.
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“wholesale suppression of truthful, nonmisleading information” did not
even meet Central Hudson’s third criterion that it “significantly advance
the [s]tate’s interest in promoting temperance.”81 Arguably, in dicta,
Justice Stevens went on to determine that the restriction also failed Central
Hudson’s fourth requirement that the government action be no more
extensive than necessary.82 Four other Justices pointed to “less
burdensome alternatives” to serve this interest to establish that the ban
failed Central Hudson’s fourth requirement that the government not
unnecessarily limit speech.83 The remaining member of the Court, Justice
Thomas, asserted that the Central Hudson test represented a regrettable
departure from what he described as Virginia State Board’s principle that
“all attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping them
ignorant are impermissible.”84
However diverse the Justices’ perspectives in 44 Liquormart were,
the succession of rulings that followed vigorously enforced Central
Hudson’s injunction against restrictions on speech “more extensive than
is necessary”85 to advance the restriction’s purpose. In Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, the Court blocked
application of a federal ban on broadcasting promotions of casino
gambling to a broadcaster located in a state where such gambling was
legal.86 The Court expressed skepticism that the ban directly advanced the
government’s interest in “alleviating the societal ills”87 arising from
gambling in light of various “exemptions and inconsistencies” in the
regulatory scheme governing broadcasts of gambling advertisements.88
However, the availability of effective “practical and nonspeech-related”
regulation decisively felled this enforcement action by showing that the
government had gratuitously limited speech.89 A similar analysis thwarted
a state’s ban on outdoor advertising of smokeless tobacco or
cigar advertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground in Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.90 However powerful the interest in curbing
81. Id. at 505 (Stevens, J., plurality).
82. Id. at 507–08.
83. Id. at 529–30 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (noting as examples the imposition of
minimum prices for, and increasing sales taxes on, alcoholic beverages).
84. Id. at 525–28. (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
85. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
86. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999).
87. Id. at 186.
88. See id. at 190–91.
89. See id. at 192 (noting, among other examples, restrictions on gambling on credit, controls on
admissions, and limitations on betting).
90. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). A separate prohibition on indoor,
point-of-sale advertising of smokeless tobacco and cigars “lower than five feet from the floor of [a]
retail establishment” located within one thousand feet of a school or playground was found to fail both
the third and fourth steps of Central Hudson. Id. at 566–67.
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underage use of tobacco, the burdens imposed by the ban did not justify
its “broad sweep.”91 Citing Greater New Orleans, the Court concluded that
the state failed to show that its restrictions were sufficiently tailored to its
interest as required by Central Hudson’s fourth step.92
In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, the Court further
demonstrated that even protection of health did not justify suppression of
speech where less speech-restrictive alternatives existed.93 Pursuant to
statutory authority, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had imposed
a tradeoff on pharmacists who wished to engage in drug compounding, a
process by which they combine ingredients to create medication
specifically tailored to a particular patient.94 To preserve their exemption
from the FDA’s burdensome safety and efficacy testing, pharmacists
refrained from advertising or promoting prescriptions for the
compounding of a specific drug or type of drug.95 As in Lorillard,96 the
Western States Court refused to condone a prohibition of truthful speech
about a legal product.97 The FDA justified the ban as one of several
restrictions on compounding designed to prevent pharmacists’
exploitation of compounding as a means of circumventing the FDA
approval process to which large-scale drug manufacturing was subject.98
Reciting Central Hudson’s fourth prong, the Court reminded the FDA that
“if the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that does not
restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do so.”99
The Court then proceeded to reel off multiple measures the government
had not pursued that might have accomplished its aim of distinguishing
between small-scale compounding and large-scale drug manufacturing
without drastically limiting speech.100
A decade after Western States, in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the
Court struck down another limit on communication about pharmaceutical
products. 101 Without committing to Central Hudson as the pertinent
standard, the Court deemed its requirements sufficient to invalidate the
91. Id. at 561.
92. Id. at 565 (citing Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. at 189 n.6).
93. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
94. Id. at 360–63.
95. See id. at 370.
96. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 525.
97. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 374.
98. Id. at 362–63.
99. Id. at 371.
100. Id. at 372–73. These included banning the use of commercial-scale equipment for
compounding drugs, capping the amount of a certain compounded drug that a pharmacy could sell in
a given period, and barring pharmacists from compounding drugs beyond those needed to fill
prescriptions already received. Id. at 372.
101. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
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disputed statute.102 Vermont barred pharmacies’ sale of “prescriberidentifiable information” to data-mining companies (unless a prescriber
consented), as well as data-mining companies’ sale of reports gleaned
from this information to pharmaceutical companies, “for marketing or
promoting a prescription drug.”103 The law sought to prevent “detailers”—
marketing representatives of pharmaceutical companies—from tailoring
their approaches to individual physicians by drawing on knowledge of a
physician’s prescribing practices.104 According to legislative findings,
typically ill-informed doctors were unduly susceptible to tendentious
marketing presentations.105 Their decisions based on “incomplete and
biased information” often resulted in unnecessarily prescribing brandname drugs rather than generic alternatives and, thus, raising health care
costs.106
Whatever the merits of Vermont’s law as policy, or the constitutional
status of a wholesale ban on the dissemination of prescriber-identifiable
information, the statute was defeated by the selectivity of its
prohibitions.107 While pharmacies could not sell the information for use in
marketing, they could do so for other purposes such as “health
care research.”108 Moreover, many other groups beyond marketing were
authorized to access to the same information: e.g., “insurers, researchers,
journalists, and [the] state.”109 To the Court, this regulatory scheme
constituted a content-based and speaker-based burden on speech.110 By its
own admission, the State had confirmed that “the law’s express purpose
and practical effect are to diminish the effectiveness of marketing by
manufacturers of brand-name drugs.”111 The State had thus impermissibly
sought to skew debate about pharmaceuticals by silencing a segment of its
participants.112 Even profit-driven marketers were entitled to the
protection of First Amendment principles: “If pharmaceutical marketing
102. See id. at 571(“[T]he outcome is the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or
a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”). The implications of Sorrell’s holding for the Central
Hudson test are discussed at infra Section II.A. and Section III.A.
103. Id. at 558–59 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2011)).
104. Id. at 558; see id. at 560–61.
105. Id. at 560–61.
106. See id.
107. As a threshold matter, the Court first rejected Vermont’s argument that principles governing
discrimination in speech did not apply because the statute regulated a “commodity.” Id. at 570. In
response, the Court invoked the established principle that “the creation and dissemination of
information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.” Id. (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 572–73.
109. Id. at 573.
110. Id. at 571.
111. Id. at 565.
112. See id. at 578–79 (“The State may not burden the speech of others in order to tilt public
debate in a preferred direction.”).
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affects treatment decisions, it does so because doctors find it persuasive.
Absent circumstances far from those presented here, the fear that speech
might persuade provides no lawful basis for quieting it.”113
B. Criticism of Central Hudson Doctrine
The Central Hudson opinion holds itself out as fashioning an
appropriate balance between the expressive and commercial aspects of
commercial speech. In a sense, the characterization of the Court’s scrutiny
as an “intermediate” level of review114 reflects its acknowledgement of
both these dimensions. Critics of this approach, both within and outside
the Court, effectively argue that it assigns excessive weight to one or the
other of these elements.
1. Intermediate Level of Review is Overly Protective
For the Court, the values and premises that prompted First
Amendment recognition of commercial speech115 did not demand full
constitutional protection of this class of expression. In Central Hudson,
the Court recognized “the ‘commonsense’ distinction between speech
proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally
subject to government regulation,” and other kinds of speech.116 In
particular, the Court further identified two features of commercial speech
that render it subject to regulation of its content. First, commercial
speakers’ familiarity with their products and markets enables them to
assess the accuracy of their representations.117 Second, the economic
motives that animate commercial speech ensure its hardiness in the face
of extensive regulation.118 Thus, the Court could accord less intense
scrutiny to restrictions on commercial speech than to those on political
113. Id. at 576.
114. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (referring to “intermediate standard of review”
for commercial speech under Central Hudson); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (describing the Court’s
four-part test in this way). See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (some
internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (citing Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989)) (“In recognition of the distinction between speech proposing a commercial
transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties
of speech, we developed a framework for analyzing regulations of commercial speech that is
‘substantially similar’ to the test for time, place, and manner restrictions.”). The question of whether
this description is apt is discussed at infra Section II.C.
115. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
116. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562 (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 564 n.6 (citing Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977)).
118. Id. But see Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U.
L. REV. 372, 385–86 (1979) (disputing the proposition that commercial speech is especially hardy).
Criticism of commercial speech’s putative hardihood as grounds for limiting its protection is discussed
at infra notes 168–72 and accompanying text.
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expression and other fully protected speech. Indeed, the vibrancy of
noncommercial speech was bolstered by withholding heightened scrutiny
from regulation of commercial speech. As the Court later observed in
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,119 “to require a parity of constitutional
protection for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could invite
dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment’s
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.”120
Notwithstanding this relegation to lesser status, numerous
commentators have criticized the Court for extending too much rather than
too little protection to commercial speech. Like Justice Rehnquist
dissenting in Virginia State Board, they believe that “a seller hawking
[their] wares” falls more in the realm of commercial regulation than of
constitutional freedom of expression.121 This kind of communication, they
argue, is far removed from the principal justifications for protecting
speech. In the immediate aftermath of Virginia State Board, C. Edwin
Baker asserted that commercial speech lacks “crucial connections” to the
“individual liberty and self-realization” that are central to the First
Amendment.122 He concluded, “a complete denial of [F]irst [A]mendment
protection for commercial speech is not only consistent with, but is
required by, [F]irst [A]mendment theory.”123 In a similar vein, Victor
Brudney later denied that commercial speech is “expression that serves
any person’s autonomy interest that the First Amendment’s special
protection can be said to reach.”124 Thomas Jackson and John Jeffries, too,
drew in part on this strand of First Amendment theory in their scathing and
oft-cited critique of Virginia State Board.125 They famously dismissed the
ruling as “economic due process . . . resurrected, clothed in the ill-fitting
garb of the [F]irst [A]mendment.”126
119. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
120. Id. at 623 (citation omitted).
121. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
122. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 3 (1976).
123. Id.
124. Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153,
1199 (2012); see id. at 1185–86 (“Commercial speech, except as it contains expression engaging
matters of societal interest, is narrowly focused on personal benefit or fulfillment—a focus that
suggests it has no greater claim to special protection of the First Amendment on grounds of autonomy
than does a person’s sale, acquisition, or consumption of the goods or services that the speech proposes
to sell.”).
125. See Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due
Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1979) (“Whatever else it[, the idea of
individual self-fulfillment,] may mean, the concept of a [F]irst [A]mendment right of personal
autonomy in matters of belief and expression stops short of a seller hawking [their] wares.”).
126. Id. at 30.
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Jackson and Jeffries also asserted the disjunction between
commercial speech and another fundamental rationale for freedom of
expression: promotion of self-government.127 The belief that commercial
speech does not contribute to the democratic process has loomed large
among advocates for reduced protection of commercial speech.128 After
the Court began routinely enforcing a stringent conception of Central
Hudson’s fourth requirement,129 Robert Post emerged as the leading
champion of such a “Meiklejohnian perspective.”130 In an influential
article, Post argued that commercial speech’s lack of contribution to public
discourse significantly limited its protection under the First
Amendment.131 Public discourse, he explained, consists of the “processes
of communication that must remain open to the participation of citizens if
democratic legitimacy is to be maintained.”132 Commercial speech
generally falls outside this domain because “we most naturally understand
persons who are advertising products for sale as seeking to advance their
commercial interests rather than as participating in the public life of the

127. See id. at 17 (“[I]n terms of relevance to political decisionmaking, advertising is neither
more nor less significant than a host of other market activities that legislatures concededly may
regulate.”). The centrality of self-governance to the First Amendment is discussed at supra note 15
and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 428 U.S. 748,
787 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disputing position, ascribed to majority opinion, that rationale
for First Amendment’s protection of “public decision making as to political, social, and other public
issues” applies to “the decision of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or another kind
of shampoo”); Lillian BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the
Substance of and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 355 (1978) (“Political speech, by contrast
[with commercial speech], deals with public decisionmaking, or at least private decisionmaking that
has a noticeable impact on the democratic process . . . . The Court’s extension of [F]irst [A]mendment
protection to the commercial speech situations that have arisen so far . . . must be characterized as
illegitimate.”); Brudney, supra note 124, at 1192 (“[C]ommercial speech is not the speech that
the First Amendment protects unless it contains expression on matters relating to public policy
decisions, or to the public interest.”); id. at 1199 n.149 (“Regulation of [urging a buy-sell transaction],
even if driven by a desire to discourage the conduct it urges, does not obscure or interfere with the
self-government or the truth-seeking process any more than would regulation of the transaction,
because the speech’s function is simply to communicate to individuals about private buy-sell
decisions, not about matters of societal import.”); Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial
Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583, 2663 (2008) (“Protection for either democracy or the
democratic process seems to offer little support for the proposition that for-profit corporations should
enjoy the same rights to speech as human beings. To the contrary, an examination of the reality of the
accumulation of resources, access to media, and corporate influence on government suggests that it is
properly restrained in support of the goal of the preservation of democracy.”).
129. See supra notes 76–113 and accompanying text.
130. Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 56
(2000).
131. See generally id.
132. Id. at 7.
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nation.”133 Accordingly, constitutional protection for commercial speech
should be made commensurate with the value of its informational
function.134 Such a project would not necessarily entail elimination of the
Central Hudson regime but rather its “principled revision.”135 For
example, Post rejected what he viewed as the simplistic antipaternalism of
the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence.136
In a later article, Post and Amanda Shanor concluded that Central
Hudson’s declaration that “[t]he First Amendment’s concern for
commercial speech is based on the informational function of
advertising”137 means commercial speech derives its constitutional
position from “the rights of listeners to receive information so that they
might make intelligent and informed decisions.”138 Others have also
argued that protection of commercial speech should be calibrated to the
interests of listeners rather than those of speakers.139 To such observers,
this more limited scope of protection would align the Court more faithfully
with its original emphasis in Virginia State Board on the value of the “free
flow of commercial information” to both consumers and society.140 It is
also seen as reflecting a fundamental divide between commercial speech
and core expression, the latter of which “the First Amendment guards
against government interference for the benefit of both the listener and the
speaker.”141 Finally, a recipient-focused model helps to account for the far
greater latitude permitted to government to regulate false commercial
speech than false expression in most other spheres.142
133. Id. at 12. See Brudney, supra note 124, at 1185 (Commercial speech “focuses only on
individuals’ private or personal good, not on matters of public interest or the societal values or attitudes
with which the First Amendment is concerned”).
134. See Post, supra note 130, at 53.
135. Id. at 56.
136. See id. at 50–54.
137. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
138. Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165,
170 (2015).
139. See, e.g., Felix T. Wu, Commercial Speech Protection as Consumer Protection, 90 U.
COLO. L. REV. 631, 631 (2019) (proposing that level of scrutiny of commercial speech regulation
should be viewed through the lens of informing consumers).
140. Felix T. Wu, The Commercial Difference, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2005, 2023 (2017)
(quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 428 U.S. 748, 763–64
(1976)); see Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“[T]he extension of
First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers
of the information such speech provides.”).
141. Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need to Break New Ground: A Response to the Supreme Court’s
Threat to Overhaul the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389, 400 (2012).
142. Compare Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(“The evils of false commercial speech, which may have an immediate harmful impact on commercial
transactions, together with the ability of purveyors of commercial speech to control falsehoods,
explain why we tolerate more governmental regulation of this speech than of most other speech.”),
with United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 726 (2012) (Kennedy, J., plurality) (finding that harms
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Some scholars have highlighted their concern that inadequate
consumer orientation spawns excessive protection of commercial speech
and thereby enables inordinate corporate power.143 For example, Tamara
Piety has warned that vigorous protection for commercial speech gives
businesses—through the vehicle of corporate personhood—a potent
cudgel to wield against government regulation.144 Indeed, she fears that
continued expansion of such protection will ultimately lead to the abolition
of the distinction between commercial speech and fully protected speech
under the First Amendment.145 Shielded in this way, corporations may
defeat regulation widely thought to promote the public’s health, safety,
and welfare.146
2. Intermediate Level of Review is Insufficiently Protective
By contrast, other scholars have urged erasing what they perceive as
artificial distinctions between commercial speech and other forms of
expression. Preeminent in this school of thought has been Martin Redish,
whose pioneering advancement of this thesis147 preceded Virginia State
Board by several years and appears to have strongly influenced the Court’s
opinion.148 Arguing that much commercial speech fosters the First
Amendment value of “rational self-fulfillment,”149 Redish advocated
“afford[ing] substantial [F]irst [A]mendment protection to all truthful,
non-misleading commercial speech.”150 In later work, Redish asserted that
speech concerning commercial goods and services shares “identical
normative concerns about self-development and self-determination”151
with political speech; lamented that the Court’s increasing protection of
caused by defendant’s misrepresentation that he held Congressional Medal of Honor did not justify
conviction for engaging in “protected speech”).
143. See generally, e.g., TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012).
144. See Tamara R. Piety, The First Amendment and the Corporate Civil Rights Movement, 11
J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 4 (2016); see also Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have
Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals,
28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 550 (2010).
145. See Piety, supra note 128, at 2584.
146. See id. at 2587–88. See also Brudney, supra note 124, at 1195 (“In the universe of retail
mass marketing, the billions of dollars spent by sellers in the aggregate to acculturate consumers to
desire products or services . . . [may] create unspecified long-term health or safety problems, or other
costs.”)
147. Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 431–32 (1971).
148. See Piety, supra note 128, at 2601 (“One cannot read [Redish’s article and the Virginia
State Board decision] without concluding that Redish persuaded the Court to adopt his theory.”).
149. Redish, supra note 147, at 443–47.
150. Id. at 447.
151. Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight
Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 81 (2007).
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commercial speech had not reached the level of full protection;152 declared
that rationales for withholding protection “come[] dangerously close to
a constitutionally destructive form of viewpoint-based regulation”;153
and—with Kyle Voils—argued against categorical denial of constitutional
protection for commercial speech.154
Other proponents of enhanced First Amendment stature for
commercial speech have echoed and expanded on Redish’s reasoning.
Such observers agree that “[c]ommercial speech, as speech, should
presumptively enter the debate with full First Amendment protection.”155
A salient theme has been that commercial speech, far from being of
inferior value, promotes central aims of the First Amendment. One of these
aims is preservation of an untrammeled “marketplace of ideas”156 to ensure
the dissemination of diverse ideas and information necessary to sound
inquiry and decisionmaking.157 In a sense, advocates of equal status for
commercial speech seek what they regard as the logical extension of the
Court’s own acknowledgement that “[t]he commercial market-place, like
other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas
and information flourish . . . . [E]ven a communication that does no more
than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the
First Amendment.”158 At any rate, champions of full constitutional
recognition of commercial speech reject diminished protection premised
on its inadequate contribution to the circulation of ideas and
information.159
152. Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, CATO INST.
(June 19, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/commercial-speech-values-freeexpression [https://perma.cc/6PAS-4BM3].
153. Redish, supra note 151, at 69.
154. Martin H. Redish & Kyle Voils, False Commercial Speech and the First Amendment:
Understanding the Implications of the Equivalency Principle, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 769
(2017).
155. Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive
Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993).
156. See supra note 16.
157. See Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50–51 (1988) (quoting Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984)) (“At the heart of the First Amendment
is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of
public interest and concern. ‘[T]he freedom to speak one’s mind . . . is essential to the common quest
for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.’”); Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138
S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018) (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014) (“[W]hen the
government polices the content of professional speech it can fail to ‘preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which the truth will ultimately prevail.’ . . . [T]he people lose when the
government is the one deciding which ideas should prevail.”); United States v. Associated Press, 52
F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (“[R]ight conclusions are more likely to
be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.”).
158. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
159. See, e.g., Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REGUL. 85,
100 (1999) (“In light of the importance of advertising to colonial Americans, attempts by modern
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Advocates for parity of commercial speech have also elaborated on
and enlarged the implications of Virginia State Board’s acknowledgement
that commercial speech can advance the First Amendment’s central aim
of enabling self-government.160 For example, Daniel Farber has disputed
the contention that “speech on commercial topics is ‘so far removed from
the context of political debate that the public’s keen interest in the
messages is totally irrelevant to [F]irst [A]mendment values.’”161 He
points out that information about a product may implicate important
political issues162 and observes that an advertisement contains the same
kind of content as a presumably protected consumer magazine.163 In a
similar vein, it has been argued that commercial speech promotes values
of self-government because it “transmits information and values that
contribute to the public’s formation of political opinions.”164 Conversely,
others have warned of the danger to democratic self-government from
permitting government suppression of truthful information even when that
information is communicated by commercial speech.165 Moreover, some
have generalized Virginia State Board’s specific remark on the capacity
of advertised drug prices to facilitate self-realization166 into a broader
assertion that commercial speech’s promotion of autonomy warrants fullblown First Amendment protection.167
constitutional scholars to treat commercial speech as ‘low value’ seem peculiar. Advertisements were
necessary to the colonial press not only because the revenue they generated was required for
newspapers to exist; they were also thought to have independent value in educating and informing the
reading public.”); Smolla, supra note 155, at 792 (“[M]ass advertising is in many respects more like
other forms of speech in the American marketplace than unlike them. The ‘negative byproducts’ that
must be listed next to any honest ingredient description of commercial speech make it look more like
the other genres of speech protected by the First Amendment, not less.”).
160. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
161. Farber, supra note 118, at 382 (quoting BeVier, supra note 128, at 353).
162. Id. (“For example, a belief that American cars are overpriced influences views on foreign
car import restrictions, on inflationary price increases for domestic cars, and on the effects of
oligopoly.”).
163. See id. at 382 n.43.
164. Jonathan Weinberg, Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 720, 745 (1982).
165. See, e.g., Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech Paradigm, 42 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 411, 490 (1992) (criticizing “such tenuous an excuse as feared harm to citizens” as
inadequate justification for suppression).
166. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
167. See Eberle, supra note 165, at 448 (“Possession of commercial information allows ‘selfrealization’ because, among other functions, it enables us to assert some measure of control over our
lives, aiding in the decisionmaking process through which we may fulfill our aspirations.”); David F.
McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78. CALIF. L. REV. 359, 429 (1990)
(“[A]dvertising implicates rationality and self-realization interests in at least four ways: advertising
allows consumers to make rational choices among goods and services, it allows consumers to make
decisions regarding the propriety of regulating certain activities, it presents ideas to consumers
regarding the nature and potential of the subject of the advertisement, and it may help create portions
of each individual’s self-perception.”); Brian J. Waters, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First
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Finally, critics of commercial speech’s secondary status have
challenged the factual predicates on which it is based. In Virginia State
Board, the Court cited commercial speech’s relative “objectivity and
hardiness” as “commonsense differences” between commercial and
noncommercial speech that justify greater regulation of the former.168 In a
notable critique, Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner disputed that either of
these qualities characterize actual commercial speech in comparison to
fully protected speech.169 As to objectivity, they observed that modern
advertising makes claims—for example, the impact a product can have on
a consumer’s social life—whose truth is impossible to ascertain.170
Conversely, some forms of noncommercial speech are fully protected
notwithstanding their objectively demonstrable falsity.171 Thus, “[t]he idea
that commercial speech is more objective than other forms of speech does
not survive the most rudimentary reality-check.”172 Additionally, Kozinski
and Banner found the assumption of commercial speech’s hardiness an
even more tenuous ground for distinguishing commercial and
noncommercial speech under the First Amendment.173 They rejected the
notion that the profit motive animating commercial speech renders it
exceptionally durable and, therefore, susceptible to greater regulation.174
To them, this rationale is amply refuted by the fully protected expression
produced for profit by a variety of media.175 Moreover, they noted that the
durability of speech can stem from “other interests . . . just as strong as
economics, sometimes stronger.”176 For example, speech motivated by
religious beliefs or artistic impulses may persist in hostile conditions that
could deter expression motivated solely by profit.177 Following Kozinski

Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 27 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1626, 1646 (1997) (“In the commercial speech context, the Court fails to recognize that
consumer choices are made for a myriad of reasons, not dictated solely by prices or product attributes.
Quite often, the choices that consumers make help them to define themselves as individuals and play
a significant role in their pursuit of self-fulfillment.”).
168. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976).
169. See generally Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?,
76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990).
170. Id. at 635.
171. Id. at 635–36 (offering, inter alia, as examples claims of the sun revolving around the earth
and of the existence of four-year-old grandmothers).
172. Id. at 636.
173. Id. at 637.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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and Banner, other commentators have similarly questioned these empirical
underpinnings of commercial speech’s subordinate status.178
II. REASONS TO DOUBT CENTRAL HUDSON’S DURABILITY
On the Supreme Court, skepticism, if not hostility, to the
intermediate scrutiny ascribed to Central Hudson appears to be in the
ascendancy. Three decisions in the past decade can be construed as
elevating the constitutional standing of commercial speech. In addition, a
quarter-century of muscular enforcement of Central Hudson’s fourth
prong might have wrenched the test from its original moorings. More
broadly, the deregulatory impulses discernible in the Court’s recent First
Amendment jurisprudence support a dilution of government’s ability to
restrain commercial activity through limitations on commercial speech.
A. Sorrell’s “Heightened Scrutiny”
As previously discussed, the Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.179
struck down Vermont’s ban on the sale and use of information about the
prescribing practices of individual physicians.180 On its face, the Sorrell
opinion did not purport to discard the Central Hudson standard for
commercial speech; rather, the Court more ambiguously observed that the
outcome is the same whether a special commercial speech inquiry or
a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”181 Nevertheless, the Court’s
rigorous application of First Amendment principles transcending
commercial speech might be construed as markedly contracting the scope
of permissible commercial speech regulation.
At a minimum, Sorrell’s reasoning blurred the line separating the
treatment of commercial and noncommercial speech. The Court explained
its application of “heightened judicial scrutiny” by Vermont’s imposition
178. See, e.g., Jef I. Richards, Politicizing Cigarette Advertising, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1147,
1194 (1996) (“While the reference to commonsense differences has been repeated so often that it has
achieved a sheen of fact and has served as a basis for several restrictions on commercial expression,
no evidence of superior verifiability or durability ever has surfaced.”); McGowan, supra note 167, at
406 (internal citation omitted) (“The Court asserted that ‘[s]ince advertising is linked to commercial
well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad
regulation.’ This reasoning, however, is not grounded in any type of [F]irst [A]mendment analysis at
all. Rather, it is an empirical prediction about the behavior of potential speakers when faced with
overbroad regulations.”); Scott Wellikoff, Note, Mixed Speech: Inequities that Result from an
Ambiguous Doctrine, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 159, 183 (2004) (“Proponents of the
distinction argue that the profit motive of the commercial speaker leads to the inability to chill it.
However[,] . . . book publishers and authors, as well as painters and lobbyist[s] engage in their
profession to seek a profit, yet are fully protected.”).
179. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
180. See supra notes 101–06 and accompanying text.
181. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571.

2021]

Stubborn Survival of the Central Hudson Test

669

of a “specific, content-based burden on protected expression.”182 The
Court relied on the implied conflation of commercial and noncommercial
speech as the authority to support its searching review. Two decisions
invalidating commercial speech restrictions183 bookend the recitation of a
series of cases involving noncommercial speech.184 Noting passages in
some of these cases affirming the importance of content neutrality, the
Court pointedly declared that “[c]ommercial speech is no exception.”185
Sorrell’s repeated condemnation of Vermont’s statute as a contentbased restriction might be viewed as a portent for the abandonment of
Central Hudson as a standard calibrated to the peculiar features of
commercial speech. As Amanda Shanor has noted, “the very category of
commercial speech is a content-based category.”186 Starting with Virginia
State Board, this aspect of commercial speech had not been thought to
preclude subjecting it to special limitations any more than with
prohibitions on such traditionally lesser protected categories as
defamation, obscenity, and fighting words. Rather, content-based
restrictions for which the Court reserved its skepticism were generally
considered those aimed at a particular message or kind of message.187 By
the time Sorrell was decided, it had long been established that contentbased restrictions in this traditional sense triggered strict scrutiny.188
Sorrell did not expressly extend this principle to commercial speech. Still,
182. Id. at 565.
183. See generally City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
184. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 565–66. These cases include United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp.,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41(1986); Minneapolis Star
& Trib. Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
185. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 566.
186. Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 151 (2016); accord Daniel J.
Croxall, Cheers to Central Hudson: How Traditional Intermediate Scrutiny Helps Keep Independent
Craft Beer Viable, 113 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 10 (2018) (“[A]ll commercial speech regulations
are inherently content-based.”).
187. See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 Va. L. Rev. 231, 244 (2012);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47 (1987).
188. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (“Content-based laws . . . are
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are
narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786,
799 (2011) (“Because the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid
unless California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a
compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”); R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (citing Boos v. Barry, 487 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)) (“Johnson’s
political expression was restricted because of the content of the message he conveyed. We must
therefore subject the State’s asserted interest in preserving the special symbolic character of the flag
to ‘the most exacting scrutiny.’”).
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the Court’s treatment of Vermont’s law as a content-based regulation
warranting “heightened scrutiny”—however ill-defined—is difficult to
reconcile with the less demanding review described in Central Hudson.189
The Court further narrowed the gap between commercial and
noncommercial speech by framing Vermont’s First Amendment offense
as viewpoint discrimination against detailers. That is, the State was
suppressing marketing representatives’ message of the value of brandname drugs over generic ones.190 Thus, the law burdened “disfavored
speech by disfavored speakers.”191 This characterization implicitly
equated the First Amendment stake in marketers’ right to present their
sales pitch with that in political speakers’ ability to argue their views. In
so doing, Sorrell marked a departure from Virginia State Board’s
emphasis on consumers’ interests192 when recognizing a significant but
limited right of commercial speech.193 A more listener-oriented approach
might have produced a different result. Felix Wu has stated that in Sorrell
“the real First Amendment interests were not those of the companies
marketing to doctors, but those of the doctors interested in receiving
information about brand-name drugs from the companies.”194 On that
premise, the ability of physicians to opt into the marketing practice at
issue,195 along with doctors’ groups having urged adoption of the law,196
could have justified the conclusion that no First Amendment values were
significantly infringed.
Moreover, Sorrell can be seen as containing the seeds of a broader
deregulatory project.197 Justice Breyer in dissent voiced exactly this
concern: “At best the Court opens a Pandora’s Box of First Amendment
challenges to many ordinary regulatory practices that may only
incidentally affect a commercial message. At worst, it
189. See Megan M. La Belle, Influencing Juries in Litigation “Hot Spots”, 94 IND. L.J. 901, 919
(2019) (“Sorrell indicates that content-based restrictions on commercial speech will be subject to a
more demanding level of scrutiny than previously understood.”).
190. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–65.
191. Id. at 564.
192. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
193. Tamara Piety has described the shift from Virginia State Board’s focus on the public interest
to gain a First Amendment foothold for commercial speech to Sorrell’s vigorous protection of speaker
autonomy as a “bait-and-switch.” Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence
of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
194. Wu, supra note 140, at 2058–59.
195. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 573.
196. See Brief for the Vermont Medical Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at
*1–3, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 52 (2011) (No. 10-779), 2011 WL 757417 (noting support
for the law by Vermont Medical Society, Maine Medical Association, New Hampshire Medical
Society, Medical Association of Georgia, American Academy of Family Physicians, and American
Academy of Pediatrics).
197. The arguable existence of such a project is discussed at infra Section II.D.
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reawakens Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of substituting judicial for
democratic decision-making where ordinary economic regulation is at
issue.”198 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Breyer pointed to regulations
whose validity could be thrown into doubt by the Court’s approach: e.g.,
forbidding a cosmetic company to make a claim about a product that has
not been substantiated by sufficient backup testing.199 Given the ubiquity
of such “content- and speaker-based”200 regulations, the specter of a
significant dismantling of the modern administrative state cannot be
dismissed as far-fetched.
Even if Justice Breyer’s fear of a First Amendment assault on
commercial regulation is not realized, his perception that the Sorrell Court
ratcheted up the ordinary level of scrutiny201 has been shared by others. A
year after Sorrell, a lower court described the ruling as having “refined the
Central Hudson test, holding that if a ban on commercial speech is
content-based, ‘heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted.’”202 Dispelling
any ambiguity about the nature of this “refinement,” the court later
mentioned matter-of-factly that Sorrell had “tightened the test for contentbased bans on commercial speech.”203 Some commentators have also
construed Sorrell as having increased the stringency of Central Hudson
even if the holding did not supplant it.204
B. Reed’s Capacious View of Content-Based Restrictions
The Court has repeatedly affirmed that content-based restrictions on
expression receive strict scrutiny.205 Less definite from the Court’s
proclamations of this principle has been the means by which content-based
and content-neutral limitations are to be distinguished.206 The distinction
198. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 602–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
199. See id. at 589–90; see also Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Protecting Free Speech
or Resurrecting Lochner?, 2011 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 142–43 (noting that extensive regulation
of content securities offerings under the Securities Act of 1933 may be subject to heightened scrutiny
after Sorrell).
200. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 564.
201. See id. at 582 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court applied a “far stricter,
specially ‘heightened’ First Amendment standard”).
202. Friendly House v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1057 (D. Ariz. 2012) (quoting Sorrell,
564 U.S. at 565).
203. Id. at 1060 (emphasis added).
204. See, e.g., Piety, supra note 193, at 4 (“Sorrell may mean that henceforth, in practice, if not
formally, commercial speech will be treated as fully protected.”); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle
M. Mello, Prospects for Regulation of Off-Label Drug Promotion in an Era of Expanding Commercial
Speech Protection, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1539, 1560 (2014) (“[T]he Sorrell decision signaled that judicial
unwillingness to countenance government restrictions on commercial speech had reached a new
level.”).
205. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165 (2015); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n,
564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011).
206. See Kendrick, supra note 187.
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is typically critical because, as Leslie Kendrick has observed, “almost all
laws fail strict scrutiny and almost all laws pass intermediate scrutiny.”207
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert,208 the Court set forth an expansive definition
of what constitutes content-based regulation of speech as “a law [that]
applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed.”209 Under this conception, a court determines whether
a regulation “‘on its face’ draws distinctions based on the message a
speaker conveys.”210 If it does, strict scrutiny applies irrespective of the
government’s permissible motive or nondiscriminatory justification.211
Moreover, even a facially neutral restriction will be considered contentbased if it cannot be “justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech.”212 Taken at face value, Reed can be understood as vastly
enlarging the sphere of speech regulation deemed content-based and, thus,
subject to strict scrutiny. More specifically, this language can be read as
sweeping aside the Central Hudson framework of intermediate scrutiny
for commercial speech.
The case itself seemed an unlikely setting for such a potentially
momentous holding. A church and its pastor challenged a provision of the
town’s sign code restricting “Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a
Qualifying Event.”213 Because the church held weekly meetings at various
locations, it posted multiple temporary signs announcing the location of
that week’s meeting.214 While the church had violated some requirements
for this category of sign, other classes of signs—particularly “Ideological”
and “Political” signs—enjoyed more generous limitations on size and
207. Id. at 238; see McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014) (describing strict scrutiny
as “exacting standard” requiring that restriction on speech be “the least restrictive means
of achieving a compelling state interest”). Gerald Gunther famously remarked that strict scrutiny was
“‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). Adam Winkler’s research led him to conclude that this phrase exaggerates the
actual survival rate of laws subjected to strict scrutiny. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict
in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 869
(2006). Accord Matthew D. Bunker, Clay Calvert &William C. Nevin, Strict in Theory, but Feeble in
Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 349,
351 (2011) (discerning “cracks in [strict scrutiny’s] structure”). However, Winkler acknowledged that
in the realm of free speech this rate was only 22%. Winkler, supra note 207, at 844. Even this low
figure may understate the lethality of strict scrutiny in this area. His research was confined to lower
court rulings, and it is not evident that these decisions reflect any modification of the Court’s severe
version of the doctrine.
208. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
209. Id. at 163.
210. Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)).
211. See id. at 165.
212. Id. at 164 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
213. Id. at 160–61.
214. Id. at 161.
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duration.215 The Court’s invalidation of the ordinance based on these
disparities was hardly contentious; the result was unanimous. Rather, three
Justices took issue with the Court’s analysis described above.216 The Court
reasoned that because the restrictions applicable to a sign “depend entirely
on the communicative content of the sign,”217 the code must be subjected
to strict scrutiny.218 Predictably, the ordinance did not survive this most
demanding standard.219
Reed’s reconceptualization of content-based regulation poses an
obvious challenge to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson. While
the Court’s opinion in Sorrell had somewhat finessed the issue,220 Reed’s
more explicit and comprehensive standard would appear incompatible
with the Central Hudson regime. After all, commercial speech regulation
intrinsically selects its objects by their content; it “definitionally
target[s] commercial speech and normally certain forms of commercial
expression.”221 Distilled to their essence in this way, commercial speech
restrictions readily qualify as government restraints “applie[d] to
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message
expressed.”222 Understandably, then, some observers have concluded that
a natural reading of Reed spells the dissolution of existing commercial
speech doctrine.223
The prospect of sweeping application of strict scrutiny to commercial
speech regulation has occasioned considerable criticism and alarm.
According to one commentator, the breadth of Reed’s formulation of
content neutrality as applied to commercial speech “does nothing to

215. Id. at 159–61.
216. See id. at 175–79 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 179–85 (Kagan, J., joined by
Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in judgment).
217. Id. at 164.
218. Id. at 171.
219. See id. at 171–72.
220. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
221. Shanor, supra note 186, at 146.
222. Reed, 576 U.S. at 163; see Mark Tushnet, The Coverage/Protection Distinction in the Law
of Freedom of Speech—An Essay on Meta-Doctrine in Constitutional Law, 25 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1073, 1080 (2017) (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)) (“Applying
the less stringent Central Hudson test to truthful non-misleading commercial speech . . . ‘restrict[s]’
expression because of its (commercial) subject matter, relative to speech, the regulation of which is
tested by a more stringent standard.”).
223. See, e.g., Lee Mason, Comment, Content Neutrality and Commercial Speech Doctrine After
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 955, 983 (2017) (“[C]omplete application of Reed to
commercial speech would essentially overrule all existing commercial speech doctrine.”); see also
David L. Hudson, Jr., The Content-Discrimination Principle and the Impact of Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 259, 276 (2019) (“It is quite difficult . . . to square the commercialspeech doctrine with numerous statements in Reed, including the Court’s take on content-based
laws.”).
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further its underlying purposes.”224 Another commentator asserted that the
subjection to strict scrutiny of all regulations aimed at specific topics
placed in jeopardy “countless legitimate regulations on expression.”225
Robert Post contended that taking Reed’s logic at its word would
“[e]ffectively . . . roll consumer protection back to the 19th century.”226
Widespread invalidation of commercial speech regulation under
Reed, while far from inevitable,227 is hardly a fanciful prospect. For
example, a New Jersey federal district court relied on Reed to apply strict
scrutiny to an Atlantic City ordinance forbidding a business to advertise
its lawful practice of allowing customers to bring their own beer and wine
(BYOB) to consume on the premises.228 Striking down this quintessential
commercial speech restriction, the court determined that this “contentbased restriction on speech . . . is not supported by a compelling
government interest nor is it the least restrictive means of achieving the
government’s stated purpose.”229 Unlike Sorrell’s equivocation on the
pertinent standard of scrutiny,230 the centrality of strict scrutiny to the
district court’s reasoning left little doubt that it viewed Reed, rather than
Central Hudson, as furnishing the decision’s governing principle. Though
the court did note that the ordinance would have failed even Central
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny,231 this portion of the opinion appears
simply to provide a reviewing court separate grounds for sustaining the
ruling should it take issue with the district court’s primary rationale under
Reed.232
The Supreme Court recently issued a ruling that can plausibly be
construed as assuming that commercial speech falls under the principle
promulgated in Reed. In Barr v. American Ass’n of Political Consultants,
224. Mason, supra note 223, at 990.
225. Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape, 22
COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 123, 124 (2017); see Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 1986 (2016) (quoting Reed, 576 U.S. at 164 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))) (“Finding a regulation to be content based whenever it cannot be
‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech’ could be read to include any
regulation that even incidentally distinguishes between activities or industries.”).
226. Adam Liptak, Court’s Free-Speech Expansion Has Far-Reaching Consequences, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speechexpansion-has-far-reaching-consequences.html [https://perma.cc/842V-N88V].
227. See infra Section III.D.
228. GJJM Enters., LLC. v. City of Atl. City, 352 F. Supp. 3d 402, 405–06 (D.N.J. 2018).
229. Id. at 405.
230. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text.
231. GJJM Enters., 352 F. Supp. 3d at 407–08.
232. See id. at 407 (presenting the analysis under Central Hudson “[a]lternatively”); see also
McGlothian v. Fralin, No. 3:18CV507(REP), 2019 WL 1087156, at *9 (E.D. Va. Jan. 23, 2019) (“Reed
provides the controlling analysis for evaluating the content neutrality of a law regulating the
certification of postsecondary schools.”).
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Inc., the Court struck down an exception from a general prohibition on
robocalls made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United
States. 233 The holding could not have occasioned much surprise. It was
anticipated by a slew of lower court decisions reaching the same
conclusion,234 and Justice Sotomayor, concurring in the judgment,
believed that the exception failed even intermediate scrutiny.235 Moreover,
the plaintiffs’ complaint that the law discriminated against their political
expression236 made it especially ripe for challenge. Nevertheless, two
aspects of the ruling offer substantial grist for an assertion that Reed’s
mandate of strict scrutiny for content-based restrictions encompasses
commercial speech regulation. First, a majority of Justices recited Reed’s
standard in unqualified terms,237 suggesting that the nature of the “content”
restricted would not affect the rule’s application. Additionally, Justice
Kavanaugh’s plurality opinion appeared to place commercial speech—or
at least its most common type—in parity with political and other protected
expression under Reed: “Although collecting government debt is no doubt
a worthy goal, the Government concedes that it has not sufficiently
justified the differentiation between government-debt collection speech
and other important categories of robocall speech, such as political speech,
charitable fundraising, issue advocacy, commercial advertising, and the
like.”238
C. Central Hudson as Functionally Strict Scrutiny
It may seem curious to suggest that the Central Hudson standard has
been undermined by one of its own provisions. If Central Hudson is
assumed to signify an intermediate level of scrutiny, however, the
potential for such dissonance inheres in the language of the Central
Hudson test’s fourth prong. To require that a restriction on commercial
speech be “not more extensive than is necessary to serve [the
233. Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020).
234. E.g., Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants v. FCC, 923 F.3d 159, 165–70 (4th Cir. 2019); Perrong
v. Liberty Power Corp., 411 F. Supp. 3d 258, 263–68 (D. Del. 2019); Gallion v. Charter Commc’ns,
Inc., 287 F. Supp. 3d 920, 926–31 (C.D. Cal. 2018); Greenley v. Laborers’ Int’l Union, 271 F. Supp.
3d 1128, 1145–51 (D. Minn. 2017); Katz v. Liberty Power Corp., No. 18-CV-10506-ADB, slip op. at
12–16 (D. Mass. Sept. 24, 2019); Taylor v. KC VIN, LLC, No. 4:19-CV-00110-NKL, slip op. at 10–
15 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 3, 2019).
235. Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2356–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment).
236. See id. at 2345 (Kavanaugh, J., plurality opinion).
237. See id. at 2347 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165 (2015)) (“[A] ‘law that
is content based’ is ‘subject to strict scrutiny.’”); id. at 2364 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he . . . rule against cellphone robocalls is a content-based restriction
that fails strict scrutiny.”) Justice Gorsuch dissented in part because he objected to the Court’s remedy
of severing the invalid provision while leaving the broad ban on robocalls intact. See id. at 2365–67.
238. Id. at 2347 (Kavanaugh, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
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government’s] interest”239 bears more than a passing resemblance to other
formulations that the Court has invoked to apply a heightened level of
review.240 Moreover, the Court’s robust enforcement of this criterion over
the past quarter-century241 supports an interpretation of its imposition of
exacting scrutiny. Thus, the traditional perception of Central Hudson has
been tacitly supplanted by the actual operation of the test.
As previously noted, Central Hudson has long been viewed as
imposing an intermediate level of scrutiny to restrictions of commercial
speech.242 Indeed, the Court stated as much in Florida Bar v. Went For It,
Inc.243 Moreover, this assessment is consonant with the Court’s description
in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox244 of
Central Hudson’s fourth part requiring only “a ‘fit’ between the
legislature’s ends and . . . means . . . that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but
one whose scope is ‘in proportion to the interest served’”245—a
characterization affirmed in Went For It246 and several other decisions.247
Scholars have also routinely affixed the “intermediate” label to Central
Hudson,248 and as recently as 2015, Robert Post could report that “[a]
consensus seems to have formed that the Central Hudson test should be
applied in a manner that exemplifies ‘intermediate scrutiny.’”249
Nevertheless, the Court’s continued vigorous application of Central
Hudson’s fourth requirement250 could be seen as transmuting the test into
a form of review more akin to strict scrutiny.251 The Court’s profession
239. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
240. See supra note 60.
241. See supra notes 76–113.
242. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
243. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (“[W]e engage in ‘intermediate’
scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech, analyzing them under the framework set forth in
[Central Hudson].”).
244. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 US 469 (1989).
245. Id. at 480 (citations omitted).
246. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 623.
247. E.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 531 (2011); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v.
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001).
248. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 793–94 (2007); Nicole B. Casarez, Don’t Tell
Me What to Say: Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 63 MO. L. REV. 929, 947
(1998); Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair Disclosure
Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2005); Allen Rostron, Pragmatism, Paternalism,
and the Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REV. 527, 537 (2013).
249. Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 881 (2015) (citation
omitted).
250. See supra notes 41–50, 76–100 and accompanying text.
251. See Post, supra note 130, at 42 (stating, in 2000, that “the Central Hudson test ha[d]
[recently] been applied with a severity that borders on strict scrutiny”); Redish & Voils, supra note
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that Central Hudson’s final step does not impose a “least restrictive
means” standard252 is belied by its decision to point to less restrictive
alternatives as grounds for invalidating commercial speech restrictions. As
early as 1993, the Court in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.253
noted its consideration of “less drastic measures” than the invalidated
restriction on commercial speech.254 Later, in Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co.,255 the availability of other, less speech-restrictive options than
forbidding beer companies from disclosing alcohol content on labels or in
advertising—limiting the alcohol content of beers, prohibiting marketing
that stresses high alcohol strength, confining the labeling ban to malt
liquors—showed that the blanket prohibition was “more extensive than
necessary” to serve the government’s interest in curbing “strength
wars.”256 In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,257 the Court
named no fewer than a half-dozen alternatives through which the
government might achieve its goals without resorting to banning
advertising of compounded drugs.258 The Court thus matched the number
of alternative measures that it had called to the government’s attention two
years earlier in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United
States.259
The possible immateriality of the formal gap between Central
Hudson and strict scrutiny was also intimated in the Court’s 2017 decision
in Matal v. Tam.260 There, the Court struck down the Lanham Act’s
“disparagement clause” prohibiting registration of trademarks “which
may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
154, at 765 (“[C]ommercial speech went from being outside the First Amendment looking in to a
status almost equivalent to that of the most protected forms of expression.”).
252. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995); cf. Daniel D. Bracciano, Comment,
Commercial Speech Doctrine and Virginia’s “Thirsty Thursday” Ban, 27 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J.
207, 236 (2017) (“A least restrictive means test for all commercial speech restrictions would require
that legislatures essentially abstain from all advertising regulation, regardless of the breadth of the
regulation, so long as it could be shown that some other avenue existed to achieve the legislature’s
desired end.”).
253. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
254. Id. at 417 n.13.
255. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
256. Id. at 490–91.
257. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2001).
258. See id. at 372; see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173,
188 (1999) (placing burden on government to show “narrow tailoring” of the regulation to the stated
interest); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regul., Bd. of Acct., 512 U.S. 136, 142
(1994) (requiring State to show that a restriction on commercial speech ”directly and materially
advances a substantial state interest in a manner no more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest”).
259. Greater New Orleans, 527 U.S. 173, 192 (1999). Greater New Orleans is discussed at supra
notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
260. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
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symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”261 Though the eightmember Court unanimously found the provision unconstitutional, the
ruling’s implications for commercial speech doctrine were more
ambiguous. Justice Alito’s four-member plurality opinion declined to
resolve whether trademarks constitute commercial speech but concluded
that the disparagement clause failed even the Central Hudson test.262
However, rather than systematically apply the standard’s four parts,
Justice Alito highlighted language from a different portion of the Central
Hudson opinion observing that “the First Amendment mandates that
speech restrictions be ‘narrowly drawn.’”263 This phrase has been
associated with stringent scrutiny,264 suggesting that the plurality assumed
a more searching conception of Central Hudson than intermediate
review.265 Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, found the question of whether trademarks should be considered
commercial speech irrelevant under a more sweeping principle: “[W]hen
the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the
ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech
in question may be characterized as commercial.”266 Though Justice
Thomas’s terse opinion did not spell out the breadth of what he considered
suppression of ideas, his previous assertions that truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech warrants full-blown First Amendment protection267
261. Id. at 1753; 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). The clause had been invoked to deny registration to the
name of a dance-rock band, “The Slants,” a derogatory term for Asian-Americans. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at
1751. The band’s members themselves were Asian-American. Id.
262. Id. at 1764 (Alito, J., plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy, speaking for four Justices,
concluded that the disparagement clause should be invalidated as impermissible viewpoint
discrimination irrespective of whether trademarks are deemed commercial speech. Id. at 1765–69
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
263. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980) (internal
citation omitted); Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764–65 (“[T]he disparagement clause is not ‘narrowly drawn’
to drive out trademarks that support invidious discrimination.”).
264. See, e.g., Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992)) (“[T]he Act . . . is invalid unless California can demonstrate that
it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is
narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (internal
citation omitted) (“[A] facially content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum . . . must
be subjected to exacting scrutiny: The State must show that the ‘regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’”); Ark. Writers’ Project,
Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (“In order to justify such [content-based] differential
taxation, the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”).
265. See The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Leading Cases, 131 HARV. L. REV. 243, 250–51
(2017) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (After Tam, “[o]ne strains to imagine a law that would survive the
Court’s modern view of Central Hudson’s narrow tailoring but fail strict scrutiny on those grounds”).
266. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
267. E.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (“I continue to believe that when the government seeks to restrict

2021]

Stubborn Survival of the Central Hudson Test

679

indicates a relatively expansive concept. Thus, at least five Justices
signaled a willingness to subject restrictions on commercial speech to a
demanding level of justification.
Taking their cue from the Court, many lower courts have applied a
version of Central Hudson’s fourth prong that is not readily
distinguishable from strict scrutiny. The Sixth Circuit, for example,
refused to dismiss a challenge by a general dentist with training in
endodontics to the state’s prohibition on identifying himself as an
“endodontist.”268 Though not reaching a startling result, the court’s
opinion directed the lower court on remand to examine skeptically under
Central Hudson the government’s justification for this ban:
[W]hen First Amendment rights are at stake, the government’s
assertions cannot be taken at face value . . . . It is only through active
judicial scrutiny of
regulations
that commercial speech can
continue “to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices
of products and services, and thus perfor[m] an indispensable role in
the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system.”269

The Eighth Circuit similarly expressed a formulation that conveyed
a probing level of review: “The fourth prong of Central Hudson is not
satisfied if there are alternatives to the regulations that directly advance
the asserted interest in a manner less intrusive to plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights.”270 In some instances, courts have disavowed reliance
on heightened scrutiny even as they pointed to alternative measures as
grounds for striking down restrictions271 or simply declared restrictions
excessive without identifying more palatable regulations.272 Where bans
truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not
the speech in question may be characterized as ‘commercial.’”); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n
v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)) (“I continue to adhere to my view that ‘[i]n cases such as this, in which the
government’s asserted interest it to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to
manipulate their choices in the marketplace,’ the Central Hudson test should not be applied because
‘such an “interest” is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of “commercial speech”
than it can justify regulations of “noncommercial” speech.’”).
268. Kiser v. Kamdar, 831 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2016).
269. Id. at 789 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)).
270. Mo. Broad. Ass’n v. Lacy, 846 F.3d 295, 302 (8th Cir. 2017) (allowing challenge to state
regulations restricting pricing information in advertisements for liquor); see also Steiner v. Superior
Ct., 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 155 (Ct. App. 2013).
271. See, e.g., Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 821, 826–27 (9th Cir. 2013) (granting
preliminary injunction against enforcement of restriction on solicitation by day laborers); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Conway, No. 3:13–CV–00229–CRS, 2014 WL 2618579, at *12–13 (W.D. Ky.
June 12, 2014).
272. See, e.g., Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 298, 301 (4th
Cir. 2013).

680

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:647

on commercial speech are justified by the danger of misleading
consumers, a vigorous conception of Central Hudson’s final part typically
assures that courts will insist on disclaimers or disclosures as less speechrestrictive substitutes.273
Indeed, the rigor of courts’ review under Central Hudson’s fourth
prong appears to have seeped into judicial application of the standard’s
third prong: “whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted.”274 Though the requirement is ostensibly not difficult to
meet,275 some courts have invoked it to overturn the government’s
judgment as to the efficacy of restrictions. Certain limitations on sexually
oriented advertisements, for example, have left courts unpersuaded that
they would appreciably advance their aims. One court rejected the
possibility that a state’s prohibition on sexually oriented businesses’
display of all images other than trademarks could “aid[] in the protection
of minors or any other governmental interest.”276 In the case of a
Tennessee ban on the sale of certain sexually themed advertisements, the
court determined that the state had “shown no evidence” that the statute
“would have any effect on child sex trafficking in Tennessee.”277 In
another illustration of judicial willingness to second-guess states’
judgment about commercial speech concerning “vice,” a court barred
enforcement of a law restricting an alcoholic beverage distributor’s
discretion to use the terms “beer,” “ale,” or “malt beverage” on its labels
or in its advertising.278 Though acknowledging that the state’s regulations
were “better than nothing” in advancing the state’s asserted interests,
meeting this low threshold fell short of the requirement that they “directly
273. Lamar Advantage GP Co., LLC v. City of Cincinnati, 155 N.E.3d 245, 257–58 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2020); see, e.g., Mass. Ass’n of Priv. Career Schs. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 205 (D. Mass.
2016); Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 641–42 (D. Vt. 2015) (denying motion to
dismiss challenge to state’s ban on use of term “natural” in advertising, labeling, and signage for
genetically engineered foods).
274. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
275. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) (“[W]e do not read our case law
to require that empirical data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background information.”);
Shannon M. Hinegardner, Note, Abrogating the Supreme Court’s De Facto Rational Basis Standard
for Commercial Speech: A Survey and Proposed Revision of the Third Central Hudson Prong, 43 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 523, 528 (2009) (“The Supreme Court and lower courts have diluted the protection of
commercial speech under Central Hudson in their application of the ‘direct advancement’ prong.”);
see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 583 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(questioning the Court’s determination that restrictions on cigar and smokeless tobacco outdoor
advertising met the third prong of Central Hudson because there was “considerable reason to doubt
that the restrictions on cigar and smokeless tobacco outdoor advertising promote any state interest”).
276. ABCDE Operating, LLC v. Snyder, No. 11–11426, 2011 WL 3113797, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
July 26, 2011).
277. Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 839 (M.D. Tenn. 2013).
278. Authentic Beverages Co., Inc. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 835 F. Supp. 2d 227,
246–47 (W.D. Tex. 2011).
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advance” those interests.279 In cases involving other subjects, courts have
repudiated the state’s premise that its limitation on commercial speech
adequately serves its stated interest.280
D. First Amendment Deregulation in Perspective
The view of Central Hudson as effecting exacting scrutiny is
reinforced by the broader deregulatory thrust of much recent First
Amendment jurisprudence. More than a few observers have echoed Justice
Breyer’s lament in Sorrell281 that the Court’s treatment of economic
regulation in free speech doctrine has become reminiscent of the Lochner
era.282 As early as Central Hudson, Justice Rehnquist in dissent had
warned against this possibility when he accused the Court of “return[ing]
to the bygone era of Lochner v. New York, in which it was common
practice for this Court to strike down economic regulations adopted by a
[s]tate based on the Court’s own notions of the most appropriate means for
the [s]tate to implement its considered policies.”283 Amanda Shanor has
warned that a literalist approach to the Free Speech Clause supplies
279. Id. at 244.
280. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 641 (D. Vt. 2015)
(concluding that the State failed to show that its ban on use of term “natural” in advertising, labeling,
and signage for genetically engineered foods “directly advances a substantial state interest”); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Conway, No. 3:13–CV–00229–CRS, 2014 WL 2618579, at *11 (W.D.
Ky. June 12, 2014) (finding failure by insurance company to establish that a blanket ban on solicitation
within thirty days of a motor vehicle accident of individuals involved in accidents “directly advances”
the State’s interest in privacy); People v. Martinez, 273 Cal.Rptr.3d 505, 531 (Ct. App. 2020) (holding
under assumption that challenged statute indirectly advanced State’s interest that “an indirect effect is
not enough to survive judicial scrutiny”); Manship v. T.D. Bank, N.A., 1:20-CV-0329 (GTS/DJS),
2021 WL 981587, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2021) (determining that “de minimis effect on consumer
choice” caused by the State’s prohibition on businesses’ imposing charges on consumers choosing
paper statements while permitting “incentives” or “credits” to those choosing electronic billing was
insufficient to advance State’s interest under Central Hudson).
281. See supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text.
282. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). This thesis is captured bluntly in
the title of Amanda Shanor’s The New Lochner, supra note 186. Other examples include Jeremy K.
Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
1953, 2007 (2018) (asserting existence and anticipating spread of “First Amendment Lochnerism”);
Morgan N. Weiland, Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian
Speech Tradition, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1472 (2017) (“[T]he doctrinal expansion of the neoLochner moment . . . risks undermining the theoretical foundation of the First Amendment itself.”);
Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1212
(2015) (asserting “striking parallels between the traditional understanding of Lochnerism and the First
Amendment critique” of regulation of data privacy); Rebecca Tushnet, Cool Story: Country of Origin
Labeling and the First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 26 (2015) (describing First Amendment
challenges to country-of-origin labeling requirements as “perhaps the clearest example of the way in
which the First Amendment has become the new Lochner, used by profit-seeking actors to interfere
with the regulatory state in a way that substantive due process no longer allows”).
283. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 589 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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abundant basis for Justices to dismantle regulation they dislike; because
“nearly all human action operates through communication or
expression, the First Amendment possesses near total deregulatory
potential.”284 From a skeptical standpoint, then, aggressive review under
Central Hudson is of a piece with parallel hostility toward disfavored
regulation in other First Amendment doctrine.
One area to which critics can point in support of this thesis is
employment law. In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, the Court held that public-sector employers could
no longer collect agency fees from nonconsenting employees.285 The
decision overturned its ruling forty-one years earlier in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education,286 which upheld laws compelling employees to
contribute a portion of the fee supporting the union’s duty to represent
employees.287 Declaring “[f]undamental free speech rights . . . at stake,”288
the Court abandoned Abood’s deferential standard as incompatible with its
larger First Amendment jurisprudence.289 The state’s “compelled
subsidization of private speech”290 could not survive a more demanding
scrutiny because agency fees were not necessary to preserve labor
peace.291 Speaking for Janus’s four dissenters, Justice Kagan voiced an
objection transcending her specific critique of the case’s outcome. After
defending the soundness of Abood’s discarded logic,292 she all but accused
the majority of seizing upon the Free Speech Clause as an instrument to
advance a conservative ideological agenda. Justice Kagan asserted the
Court had “weaponize[ed] the First Amendment, in a way that unleashes
judges . . . to intervene in economic and regulatory policy.”293
Having previously wielded the First Amendment as such a “sword,”
the Court was poised to continue to override legislative economic and

284. Shanor, supra note 186, at 135; see Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138
S. Ct. 2448, 2502 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Speech is everywhere—a part of every human
activity (employment, health care, securities trading, you name it). For that reason, almost all
economic and regulatory policy affects or touches speech.”).
285. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
286. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
287. Id. at 225–26. The Court allowed dissenting employees to deduct the part of the fee
allocated to advancing political or “other ideological causes.” Id. at 235–36.
288. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460.
289. See id. at 2479–80.
290. Id. at 2464.
291. See id. at 2465–66. The Court went on to explain that compulsory fees also could not be
justified by the goal of preventing nonmember “free riders” who received the benefits of union
representation without bearing its costs. See id. at 2466–69.
292. See id. at 2488–2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 2501.
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regulatory decisions by this means.294 Should the Court embark on the path
feared by Justice Kagan, it would not lack for free speech theories in the
workplace setting championed by business groups and sometimes
receiving a sympathetic hearing in lower courts. Two years before Janus,
Charlotte Garden traced salient themes in this movement.295 Indeed, she
highlighted the later-successful effort to overturn Abood’s approval of
compulsory agency fees.296 Another focus, on efforts to secure heightened
scrutiny of occupational speech,297 may be said to anticipate the Court’s
decision the same term as Janus invalidating required notices for crisis
pregnancy centers.298
The ubiquity of communication in enterprises affords vast potential
for invalidating regulation that would presumably be upheld if considered
only as restrictions on conduct. One kind that has already shown itself
vulnerable to such attacks is business licensing schemes.299 In at least two
instances, courts have struck down licensing requirements for tour guides
as unduly interfering with their freedom of expression. The D.C. Circuit’s
opinion in Edwards v. District of Columbia, in particular, furnishes frank
evidence for the view that the decision resulted from “Lochnerizing” the
First Amendment. 300 The court not only dismissively rejected the value of
the exam at issue testing “knowledge of buildings and points of historical
and general interest in the District”;301 the opinion also invoked the
authority of Adam Smith to support the assumption that guides’ stake in
their reputation would prompt them to perform their service well.302 A
district court in Georgia did not go quite so far in espousing economic
theory when overturning Savannah’s requirements that tour guide
294. See id. at 2501–02; Kate Andrias, Janus’s Two Faces, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 21, 49
(“Janus raises the possibility that exclusive representation could itself be deemed
unconstitutional . . . . After all, if compelled union fees in the public sector constitute an incurable
First Amendment harm, why doesn’t compelling a dissenter to be bound by the agreement of a union
with which it disagrees?”).
295. See generally Charlotte Garden, The Deregulatory First Amendment at Work, 51 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (2016).
296. See id. at 340–48.
297. See id. at 351–53.
298. See generally Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). The
case is discussed at infra Section II.E.
299. See Shanor, supra note 186, at 181 (“Because most, if not all, commercial services operate
at least in part through the use of words, all business licensing schemes are in principle susceptible to
First Amendment challenge.”).
300. Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
301. Id. at 1005 (“Even if we indulged the District’s apparently active imagination [as to harm
caused by inadequately informed tour guides], the record is equally wanting of evidence the exam
regulation actually furthers the District’s interest in preventing the stated harms.”); see id. at 999–
1007.
302. See id. at 1006–07 (citing ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 12 (Digireads.com Publishing 2004) (1776)).
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applicants pass a test on the city’s history and architecture as well as a
criminal background check.303 Still, the court similarly concluded that
neither provision was shown to foster the city’s interests sufficiently to
justify their infringement on free speech.304 Admittedly, tour-conducting’s
essential nature as an expressive activity renders it especially susceptible
to this kind of analysis. An emphasis on the communicative aspect of
commercial transactions, however, could call into question a whole array
of government attempts to place limits on commercial activity.305
One realm in which the disputed line between speech and conduct
has conspicuously tilted toward speech-based deregulation is campaign
finance. Of course, the seismic event in this development was the Court’s
ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.306 There, the
Court struck down a federal law prohibiting corporations and unions from
using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for
speech intended to affect the outcome of an election.307 The large impact
of Citizens United on the past decade’s sharp rise in campaign spending is
well-known and well-documented.308
303. See Freenor v. Mayor of Savannah, No. CV414-247, 2019 WL 3315274 (S.D. Ga. July 22,
2019).
304. See id. at *10–12.
305. The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Nordyke v. Santa Clara Cnty., 110 F.3d 707 (9th Cir.
1997), illustrates the far-reaching potential of this approach. There, the court enjoined enforcement of
a county lease addendum intended to “prohibit any person from selling, offering for sale, supplying,
delivering, or giving possession or control of firearms or ammunition to any other person at a gun
show at the [county] fairgrounds.” Id. at 708–09. The Court applied a First Amendment standard that
the restriction did not meet because the provision represented an intrusion on free speech by entailing
a ban on extending offers to sell firearms or ammunition. Id. at 710–13.
306. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). The first landmark case involving First
Amendment constraints on regulation of campaign finance was Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(per curiam). While sustaining the Federal Election Campaign Act’s limits on direct contributions to
candidates, id. at 23–38, Buckley struck down the application of the Act’s expenditure ban to
individuals, corporations, and unions, id. at 39–59. To many observers, however, Citizens United
represented a dramatic and unwarranted extension of Buckley. See, e.g., Miriam Galston, Buckley 2.0:
Would the Buckley Court Overturn Citizens United?, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 687 (2020) (arguing that
proper application of principles and reasoning in Buckley would invalidate Citizens United).
307. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318–19.
308. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Quasi Campaign Finance, 70 DUKE L.J. 333, 359–60
(2020) (stating that “entire cottage industries of scholarly commentary” have been devoted to the sharp
increase in campaign spending since Citizens United); Bob Biersack, Eight Years Later: How Citizens
United Changed Campaign Finance, OPEN SECRETS (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.opensecrets.org/
news/2018/02/how-citizens-united-changed-campaign-finance/ [https://perma.cc/V955-EVE7];
Brian Schwartz & Lauren Hirsch, Presidential Elections Have Turned into Money Wars — Thanks to
a Supreme Court Decision in 2010, CNBC (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/19/
presidential-elections-are-now-money-battlesthanks-to-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/YLS22G5D]. Subsequent decisions struck down provisions of state schemes for regulating campaign
finance. See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. 516, 516–17 (2012) (per curiam) (striking
down Montana’s prohibition on corporations’ making “an expenditure in connection with a candidate
or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party”); Ariz. Free Enter.
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The intense scrutiny that overthrew restrictions on campaign
contributions in Citizens United derived much of its potency from the
premise of constitutional corporate personhood. Applying the principle
that government may not “impose restrictions on certain disfavored
[political] speakers,” the Court began by noting that “First Amendment
protection extends to corporations.”309 To underscore the solidity of this
principle, the Court offered a long compendium of cases in which it had
recognized such protection.310 Thus, “political speech does not lose First
Amendment protection simply because its source is a corporation.”311 To
critics, the Court’s “very robust conception of corporate personhood”312
has overstretched the extent to which corporations should enjoy rights of
speech. For them, the Court has drawn a false equivalence between
corporations deploying the First Amendment to resist unwelcome
regulation and suppressed individuals seeking to vindicate the truthseeking and democratic values underpinning free expression.313 One critic
has asserted that decisions assuming this convergence ignore the reality
that “corporations do not act like human beings because they cannot and
because they are fundamentally unlike the human stockholders.”314
Another particularly harsh appraisal has denounced “[t]he predatory
attempt by corporations to appropriate” core values of freedom of speech
as “conceptual and normative fraud.”315 Whatever the merits of these
critiques, their force and frequency reflect the success of corporations’
efforts to utilize the First Amendment to defeat unwelcome regulation.
Another means of enabling profit-seeking actors to benefit from free
expression’s loftier themes is to shrink the conception of commercial
speech itself. Insofar as commercial speech might retain heightened
susceptibility to regulation, designating more speech outside this category
advances deregulatory aims. In this area, the Court has considerable
latitude to write on a slate that is, though not blank, rather sketchy. The
Court’s occasional gestures at a definition for commercial speech have
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2011) (invalidating law providing
matching funds to political candidates relying on public financing whose privately financed opponents
spent above a certain amount). But see Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 433 (2015)
(upholding Florida law “provid[ing] that judicial candidates ‘shall not personally solicit campaign
funds . . . but may establish committees of responsible persons’ to raise money for election
campaigns”).
309. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341–42.
310. See id. at 342 (citing twenty cases).
311. Id. at 343 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
312. Piety, supra note 144, at 2.
313. See generally id.
314. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding ‘We the People’s’
Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 423, 439 (2016).
315. ROGER A. SHINER, FREEDOM OF COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION 3 (2003).
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been notoriously inexact.316 In different opinions, the Court has variously
described commercial speech as “communication that does no more than
propose a commercial transaction,”317 “expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience,”318 and a “commonsense” matter of “speech proposing a commercial transaction, which
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation.”319
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,320 the Court did identify salient
features to be considered when determining the character of debated
expression: an advertising message, a reference to a specific product, and
an economic motive for the communication.321 These factors, however,
fall well short of supplying definitional guidance in a disputed case.322
Complicating the inquiry is the challenge of determining when speech
with a commercial character is “inextricably intertwined with otherwise
fully protected speech” so as to heighten the scrutiny applied.323 Moreover,
316. See Piety, supra note 128, at 2592 (“There is not a very clear working definition of
what commercial speech is.”); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the
First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1184–85 (1988) (“[T]he Supreme Court, for all it has said
about commercial speech, has conspicuously avoided saying just what it is.”).
317. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
318. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’ n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
319. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
320. Bolger v. Younds Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
321. Id. at 66–67; Alexander Tsesis, Marketplace of Ideas, Privacy, and the Digital Audience,
94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1585, 1597 (2019) (“The commercial nature of advertisements to gain profits
distinguishes it from protected explorations of ideas, facts, philosophies, and tastes.”).
322. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1190 (2019)
(“[Bolger’s] definition, while seemingly specific, leaves many questions unanswered.”); Todd F.
Simon, Defining Commercial Speech: A Focus on Process Rather than Content, 20 NEW ENG. L. REV.
215, 237 (1984–1985) (“The greatest difficulty with “[Bolger’s] attempted test and the definitional
factors on which it rests, is that it is both too broad and too narrow.”); Glenn C. Smith, Avoiding
Awkward Alchemy in the Off-Label Drug Context and Beyond: Fully-Protected Independent Research
Should Not Transmogrify into Mere Commercial Speech Just Because Product Manufacturers
Distribute It, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 963, 1012–16 (2000) (objecting to Bolger test’s reliance on
speakers’ motives to determine characterization of speech ). The Court was presented with the
opportunity to clarify the application of Bolger’s indicia in Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per
curiam), but dismissed the writ of certiorari as having been improvidently granted. Id. at 655. The case
involved a private suit under California law for public statements by Nike that allegedly
misrepresented its labor practices in southeast Asia. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002). For
the view that Nike’s assertions qualified as commercial speech under all three of the factors described
in Kasky, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What Is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not
Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143, 1145–56 (2004).
323. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795–96 (1988); see also
Andrew J. Wolf, Note, Detailing Commercial Speech: What Pharmaceutical Marketing Reveals About
Bans on Commercial Speech, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1291, 1294 (2013)
(“[M]ost commercial speech contains forms of both commercial and noncommercial speech.”).
Compare Riley, 487 U.S. at 781 (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate the State’s regulation of
charitable solicitation practices that determined reasonableness of fees charged by professional fund
raisers by using percentages of receipts collected), with Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)
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critics who favor broader government authority to regulate commercial
speech have criticized the Court’s conception of its range as simplistic and
underinclusive.324
Traditionally, the absence of a distinct line between commercial and
noncommercial speech has presented little problem in practice,325 but the
issue may loom larger as the Court withdraws expression from the
arguably commercial realm. One indication of such a tendency appears in
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.326 There, the Court assumed—but refused to
hold—that the information being sold on doctors’ prescribing practices
constituted commercial speech subject to the Central Hudson test.327
Similarly, in Matal v. Tam,328 the Court declined to resolve whether
trademarks constitute commercial speech329 because the “disparagement
clause” violated the First Amendment even on the premise that they do.330
Even under this analysis, however, Justices invoked First Amendment
ideals more associated with fully protected speech. Justice Alito observed:
The Government [in this case] has an interest in preventing speech
expressing ideas that offend . . . . [T]hat idea strikes at the heart of
the First Amendment . . . . [T]he proudest boast of our free speech
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express “the thought
that we hate.”331

Justice Kennedy in turn quoted Justice Holmes’s classic exposition
on “the ‘free trade in ideas’ and the ‘power of . . . thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market.’”332 The discussion of these
core First Amendment principles suggests that if any gap persists between

(applying Central Hudson standard upholding the university’s restriction on “Tupperware parties”
with primary purpose of selling housewares that included discussion of other topics such as home
economics).
324. See, e.g., Post, supra note 130, at 18 (“The evaluations of ‘commonsense’ are complex,
contextual, and ultimately inarticulate . . . . [T]he judgments of common sense ultimately revolve
around questions of social meaning; they turn on whether the utterance of a particular speaker should
be understood as an effort to engage public opinion or instead simply to sell products.”).
325. See Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L.
REV. 55, 94–101 (1999) (arguing that the nature of the speech in question is typically evident).
326. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
327. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
328. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
329. See supra notes 262–64 and accompanying text.
330. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text.
331. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (Alito, J., plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
332. Id. at 1767–68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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commercial and noncommercial speech,333 it may be rendered
substantially irrelevant by deeming classes of commerce-related
expression to be the latter.
Whatever the Court’s specific strategy, the deregulatory potential of
a “loaded” First Amendment is nearly limitless. After all, “virtually all
government regulations will, in one way or another, ‘burden’ speech, if by
speech we mean the use of human language.”334 Robert Post and Amanda
Shanor argue that systematic application of this proposition will mean that
“[w]e must . . . turn back our democracy to the juristocracy that controlled
society in the days of Lochner.”335 Whatever the prospects for such a
system, it is only realistic to expect that Justice Ginsburg’s replacement by
Justice Barrett will amplify the trend they lament.336 That movement’s
ramifications for Central Hudson remain to be seen.
E. Implications of NIFLA
One recent ruling both furthers the Court’s deregulatory tilt and
specifically—if indirectly—bears on the Central Hudson test. In National
Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra337 (NIFLA), the Court
departed from the lenient approach to compelled commercial speech it had
taken in earlier cases.338 The decision may imply a willingness to further

333. See Leading Cases, supra note 265, at 252 (“It remains to be seen [after Tam] . . . if the
Court will place commercial speech on equal constitutional footing with noncommercial speech or
whether that potential decision will recede in importance as Central Hudson intensifies.”).
334. Post & Shanor, supra note 138, at 179 (citation omitted).
335. Id.
336. See Charley Moore, Is Amy Coney Barrett Really the Next Clarence Thomas (for
Business)?, LINKEDIN (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/amy-coney-barrett-really-nextclarence-thomas-business-charley-moore/ [https://perma.cc/2UK5-4WAH] (pointing to study
covering period of October 2018 to October 2020 indicating that 21% of Justice Ginsburg’s opinions
in cases implicating business interests favored business interests while 83% of Judge Barrett’s
opinions favored business interests); Becca Damante, Will Supreme Court Nominee Amy Coney
Barrett Be a Reliable Vote for Big Business?, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. 7 (Oct. 2020)
https://www.theusconstitution.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Issue-Brief-Will-Supreme-CourtNominee-Amy-Coney-Barrett-Be-A-Reliable-Vote-for-Big-Business-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9W8R2764] (cataloging Judge Barrett’s rulings on issues relevant to corporate interests and stating “time
and again Judge Barrett has sided with corporate and employer interests.”).
337. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
338. An arguable exception to this characterization is United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533
U.S. 405 (2001). There, the Court struck down a federal law authorizing assessments on handlers of
fresh mushrooms as applied to a grower that objected to the content of advertisements funded by such
assessments. See id. at 411. The holding, however, stood at the midpoint between two rulings in which
the Court upheld compelled subsidies for similar advertising campaigns. See generally Johanns v.
Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (campaign promoting consumption of beef); Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (promotion of “California Summer Fruits”). Thus,
the precedential significance of United Foods was clouded when NIFLA was decided. See Robert
Post, Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. CT.
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intensify scrutiny of government restrictions on commercial speech as
well.
Prior to NIFLA, the government’s burden to justify compulsions of
commercial speech—mainly disclosures and disclaimers—was widely
thought to be much lighter than the demonstration required to uphold
restrictions.339 In this area, the Court had recognized “material differences
between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.”340
It is true that Justice Jackson’s iconic opinion in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette341 established a fundamental right not to serve as
a mouthpiece for government-prescribed messages. The ideological cast
of the mandated expression342 and principle promulgated there,343
however, were far removed from government’s typical directive to provide
factual information in commercial settings.344
In Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the Court appeared to
act on such a distinction between expression of opinion and
communication of commercial information when it described the criteria
for permissible compelled commercial speech.345 There, the Court allowed
the State to require attorneys to note in advertisements of certain
REV. 195, 218 (referring to “the painful uncertainty evinced by . . . [the] Glickman-United FoodsJohanns trilogy”). At any rate, the Court’s opinion in NIFLA did not mention United Foods.
339. See Laura Murphy, Jillian Bernstein & Adam Fryska, More Than Curiosity: The
Constitutionality of State Labeling Requirements for Genetically Engineered Foods, 38 VT. L. REV.
477, 486 (2013) (“For factual disclosure requirements, the Court generally applies a lesser standard of
review [than Central Hudson] and evaluates the requirement under Zauderer’s rational basis-type
standard.”); Andrew C. Budzinski, Note, A Disclosure-Focused Approach to Compelled Commercial
Speech, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1305, 1313 (2014) (“[S]o long as the disclosure does not hamper the
advertiser’s right to distribute other information, compelled speech is far easier to justify under
Zauderer’s ‘reasonably relates’ standard than are restrictions under Central Hudson.”); Jennifer M.
Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 556–57 (2012) (“The [Zauderer] Court’s lack of any extensive discussion
of Central Hudson’s more restrictive test suggests that its rationale for applying lesser scrutiny
to compelled commercial speech lay in the difference between compelling additional factual speech
and restricting speech, not on the particular state interest motivating the disclosure under
consideration.”); Wu, supra note 139, at 2039–40 (“What [Zauderer] says is that if a disclosure is of
‘purely factual and uncontroversial information,’ then it can be required of an advertisement without
unduly chilling that advertisement, and thus, the government needs only a sufficient interest to support
such a requirement, rather than needing to satisfy the full Central Hudson test.”).
340. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985).
341. W.V. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
342. The Court upheld schoolchildren’s right to refrain from participating in ceremony of
saluting the flag and reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. Id. at 642.
343. See id. (“[N]o official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.”), see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (rejecting governmental power to
require individuals to “be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view
[they] fin[d] unacceptable”).
344. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
345. Id.
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contingent-fee rates that clients would be liable for costs in any event and
particularly that clients would be responsible for court costs and
expenses.346 Disclosures of this nature were valid if they were “reasonably
related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers” and
not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”347 Also significant to the Court in
Zauderer—and presumably future cases—was that the State had done no
more than instruct attorneys to “include in [their] advertising purely
factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which
[their] services will be available.”348
The latitude afforded to the government under Zauderer was
reinforced twenty-five years later in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States.349 In Milavetz, the Court sustained a law requiring attorneys
who provided bankruptcy-assistance services to include in advertising the
statement (or its equivalent): “We are a debt relief agency. We help people
file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code.”350 Applying
Zauderer’s “less exacting scrutiny,” the Court would permit the
government to require “an accurate statement identifying the advertiser’s
legal status and the character of the assistance provided.”351
In striking down two compelled notices in NIFLA, the Court ruled
that one fell outside of Zauderer’s test and the other failed it. Both notices
covered by the California law at issue applied to crisis pregnancy centers:
organizations that provide a limited range of pregnancy-related services
and aim to dissuade women from seeking abortions.352 One provision
required licensed clinics to notify women visiting a clinic that California
offered free or low-cost pregnancy-related services, including abortions,
and to include contact information on access to these services.353 The
Court characterized this provision as a “content-based regulation of
speech” directly at odds with the petitioners’ mission.354 Because that
content went beyond “purely factual and uncontroversial information
about the terms under which . . . services will be available,” Zauderer’s
relatively relaxed standard did not apply.355 The Court explained that
“[t]he notice in no way relates to the services that licensed clinics
provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose information
346. Id. at 652.
347. Id. at 651.
348. Id.
349. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010).
350. Id. at 233 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(4) (2006)).
351. Id. at 249–50.
352. Nat’l Inst. Of Fam. & Life Advocs. V. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368 (2018).
353. Id. at 2368–69.
354. Id. at 2371.
355. See id. at 2372 (quoting Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
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about state-sponsored services—including abortion, anything but an
‘uncontroversial’ topic.”356 In the Court’s eyes, the notice could not
survive even intermediate scrutiny—much less the strict scrutiny
ordinarily applied to content-based limitations.357 The second provision,
requiring clinics not licensed by the State to provide medical services to
announce this status,358 fared even more poorly. Assuming without
deciding that Zauderer applied, the Court concluded that the notice could
not survive even that less demanding standard.359 Rather, it was held
“‘unjustified’” and “‘unduly burdensome’” because it “impose[d] a
government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement that is wholly
disconnected from California’s informational interest.”360
Without squarely questioning Zauderer, the NIFLA Court laid the
seeds for more rigorous scrutiny of compelled commercial speech than the
previously understood level of review. By excluding the notice of
California’s services from Zauderer’s scope, NIFLA contracted the range
of mandated expression to which Zauderer’s presumably lenient standard
would apply. Most notably, prior to NIFLA it was generally thought that
Zauderer’s reference to “purely factual and uncontroversial information”
had meant that the accuracy of the information the speaker must convey is
not in serious dispute.361 The withdrawal from Zauderer’s governmentfriendly ambit of mandates on topics deemed controversial potentially
subjects a multitude of disclosures and disclaimers to heightened scrutiny.
Still further, the Court’s invalidation of the required notice of unlicensed
clinics’ statuses raises the possibility that a more demanding version of
Zauderer itself now exists to which the Court can resort to gut
disfavored362 compulsions. Zauderer’s requirement that a compelled
356. Id.
357. See id. at 2375–76.
358. Id. at 2370. The notice also had to state that “the State of California has no licensed medical
provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of services.” Id.
359. Id. at 2377–78.
360. Id. (quoting Zauderer, 471 U. S. at 651).
361. See Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions,
Facts, and Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 29–30 (2016); Disc. Tobacco City &
Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th Cir. 2012); Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the
Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31, 73–74 (2016); Seana
Valentina Shiffrin, Compelled Speech and the Irrelevance of Controversy, 47 PEPP. L. REV. 731, 739
(2020). NIFLA, of course, augmented rather than supplanted the requirement that a compelled
statement be factually uncontroversial. See Cal. Chamber of Com. V. Becerra, No. 2:19-cv-02019KJM-EFB, 2021 WL 1193829, at *13–14 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2021) (finding that the State’s required
statement that acrylamide causes cancer was sufficiently disputed and that it was not uncontroversial
under Zauderer).
362. Critics have charged that the NIFLA majority was largely animated by a desire to shield the
anti-abortion mission of crisis pregnancy centers. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin,
Constitutional Gerrymandering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61,
66 (2019) (“[W]e believe [NIFLA] is primarily about five conservative Justices’ hostility to abortion
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disclosure be “reasonably related to the State’s interest”363 had been
perceived as indicating the traditionally permissive364 rational relationship
standard.365 In NIFLA, however, it was the State that had to overcome a
presumption that the notice was unjustified and unduly burdensome.366
III. SALVAGING A ROLE FOR CENTRAL HUDSON
As discussed in Part II, both specific Court decisions and broader
doctrinal developments suggest an ominous future for the Central Hudson
test as affording government considerable latitude to regulate commercial
speech. Nevertheless, alternative perspectives on these rulings and trends
exist that do not augur the inevitable assignment of commercial speech to
the realm of fully protected expression. Evidence of their plausibility
appears most visibly in lower court holdings that do not embrace
maximalist interpretations of the Court’s safeguards against regulation.
rights. The Court ignored legal precedent, failed to weigh the interests at stake in its decision, and
applied a more demanding standard based on content of speech.”); see also Clay Calvert, Is Everything
a Full-Blown First Amendment Case After Becerra and Janus? Sorting Out Standards of Scrutiny and
Untangling “Speech as Speech” Cases from Disputes Incidentally Affecting Expression, 2019 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 73, 84 (2019) (suggesting that the outcome in NIFLA was shaped by effort of “the
conservative justices . . . to protect pro-life organizations”). As specific evidence, they point to what
they consider the artificial distinction drawn between California’s invalidated notice provisions and
the requirement of informed consent for abortions upheld in Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992). See NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2373–74; Helen Norton, Essay, Pregnancy and
the First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2417, 2429 n.72 (2019) (“[F]rom a listener’s
perspective, Casey and NIFLA cannot both be right. But even if we focus only
on speakers’ interests, Casey and NIFLA cannot both be right.”); Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra, at
110 (“Simply stated, the majority’s justifications distinguishing Casey from NIFLA v. Becerra stretch
their holding’s credibility.”).
363. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
364. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (“On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute such as the Cable Act
comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, and those attacking the rationality of the
legislative classification have the burden to negate every conceivable basis which might support it.”);
Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Review, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 802 (2006)
(“Under rational basis [review] . . . statutes will nearly always be seen as legitimate, irrespective of
the strength of the individual’s interest and regardless of the larger constitutional regret that denying
such an interest may entail.”).
365. See Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ.
L. REV. 647, 680–81 (2015) (“The Court in Zauderer . . . subjected mandated speech disclosures . . .
[to a] relaxed standard, akin to rational basis review.”); Keighley, supra note 339, at 556 (“[A] close
reading of Zauderer suggests that compelled commercial speech should be subject to rational basis
scrutiny even if other interests motivated the state regulation.”); Richard F. Lee, Note, A Picture is
Worth a Thousand Words: The Marketplace of Ideas and the Constitutionality of Graphic-Image
Cigarette Warning Labels and Other Commercial Disclosure Requirements, 84 U. COLO. L. REV.
1179, 1219–20 (2013) (“[T]he [Zauderer] Court required only a rational relationship between the
disclosure requirement at issue and the government interest it was meant to serve.”).
366. See Nat’l Inst. Of Fam. & Life Advocs. V. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2377 (2018) (internal
citation omitted) (“California has the burden to prove that the unlicensed notice is neither unjustified
nor unduly burdensome. It has not met its burden.”).
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A. A Narrower View of Sorrell
Though Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.367 can be read to raise the scrutiny
of commercial speech regulation,368 the idiosyncrasy of its facts leaves
scope for a less sweeping interpretation. The nature and salience of
Vermont’s discrimination against market detailers,369 in particular, make
the case susceptible to distinction from other circumstances. It is perhaps
unsurprising, then—as discussed below—that many lower courts have
treated Central Hudson as essentially unaffected by Sorrell’s holding.
Vermont’s ban was unusual and unusually vulnerable because it
singled out a specific class of speakers forbidden to employ certain
information available to others to use as they saw fit. Favored speakers,
such as researchers and journalists, could obtain this information for their
purposes, but drug marketers could not.370 This pinpoint prohibition was
exacerbated by the State’s frank avowal that it sought to bar marketers
from exploiting this data in part out of fear of the communicative impact
of their message.371 For the Court, Vermont’s stated aim of protecting the
integrity of physicians’ prescribing decisions foundered on a principal
function of the First Amendment: checking speech restrictions that are
premised on the “fear that people would make bad decisions if given
truthful information.”372 The Court thus left open the possibility that
restrictions not containing these defects would survive through a less
rigorous review—in particular, intermediate scrutiny under Central
Hudson.373
367. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
368. See supra Section II.A.
369. See supra notes 107–13, 190–91 and accompanying text.
370. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 573. The Court has elsewhere expressed its disapproval of speech
restrictions based on the identity of speakers. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340
(2010) (citation omitted) (“Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers,
allowing speech by some but not others. As instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated:
Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control
content.”); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. V. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784–85 (1978) (“In the realm of
protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating . . . the speakers who
may address a public issue.”).
371. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 561, 575–76.
372. Id. at 577.
373. Oleg Shik, Note, The Central Hudson Zombie: For Better or Worse, Intermediate Tier
Review Survives Sorrell v. IMS Health, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 561, 564
(2015) (“[I]n the absence of a clear mandate for strict scrutiny, lower courts should not treat Sorrell’s
new ‘heightened judicial scrutiny’ standard as dispositive, and opt instead for the traditional and
familiar intermediate-tier analysis.”); Thomas A. Zelante Jr., Comment, Paper or Plastic: Speech in
an Unlikely Place, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 931, 937 (2018) (quoting Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 590 (Breyer,
J., dissenting)) (arguing that the Court probably did not intend for Sorrell to supplant the
Central Hudson standard for restrictions on commercial speech because requiring that content-based
and speaker-based commercial speech regulations be subjected to strict scrutiny would
“‘threaten[] . . . widely accepted regulatory activity’ in nearly all commercial sectors”); Constance E.
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Thus, many courts after Sorrell continued to adhere to the Central
Hudson framework when assessing limitations on commercial speech. In
the course of upholding restrictions, some courts have spelled out why
Sorrell was factually distinguishable from the case at hand.374 One court
observed the “legion” of distinctions between the Vermont statute in
Sorrell and the regulation before it and enumerated four of them.375 A
number of courts sustaining restrictions explained why Sorrell did not alter
the existing standard of intermediate scrutiny;376 others have flatly asserted
this to be true.377 In many cases, courts have applied Central Hudson
without mentioning Sorrell at all.378 In some such instances, courts have
Bagley, Joshua Mitts & Richard J. Tinsley, Snake Oil Salesmen or Purveyors of Knowledge: Off-Label
Promotions and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 356 (2013)
(arguing that limitations on commercial speech of a particular industry should be subjected to
intermediate scrutiny where they are not based on unfounded paternalism and do not discriminate
against disfavored industry participants); Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Pandora’s Box of 21st Century
Commercial Speech Doctrine: Sorrell, R.A.V., and Purpose-Constrained Scrutiny, 19 NEXUS: CHAP.
J.L. & POL’Y 19, 41–42 (2014) (arguing that Sorrell is consistent with precedent allowing contentbased restrictions on commercial speech only for certain reasons).
374. E.g., N.J. Dep’t of Lab. & Workforce Dev. V. Crest Ultrasonics, 82 A.3d 258, 268 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (finding that the prohibition at issue, unlike the Vermont statute in Sorrell,
did not disfavor a particular content or a particular kind of speaker); S.F. Apartment Ass’n v. City &
Cnty. Of S.F., 142 F. Supp. 3d 910, 924 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Sorrell is distinguishable . . . [because] the
restriction in the present case is not an absolute prohibition on speech, but simply a condition that must
be fulfilled before the speech can take place.”); Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 944 F.3d 267, 289 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (describing reasons why plaintiff’s reliance on Sorrell was “misplaced”).
375. Chiropractors United for Rsch. And Educ., LLC v. Conway, No. 3:15-CV-00556-GNS,
2015 WL 5822721, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 1, 2015).
376. See, e.g., King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303, 308–09 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (“If
the [Sorrell] Court wished to disrupt the long-established commercial speech doctrine as applying
intermediate scrutiny, it would have expressly done so. Absent express affirmation, this Court will
refrain from taking such a leap.”); Boelter v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 172, 196 n.11
(S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Absent controlling precedent to the contrary, the Court continues to apply
intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny to content-based regulations targeting commercial speech.”);
Contest Promotions, LLC v. City & Cnty. Of S.F., 874 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Sorrell did not
mark a fundamental departure from Central Hudson’s four-factor test, and Central Hudson continues
to apply.”); Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Prieto (RDN), 861 F.3d 839, 846 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
377. See, e.g., Vugo, Inc. v. City of New York, 931 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2019) (“We hold that
[after Sorrell] the Central Hudson test still applies to commercial speech restrictions.”), cert. denied
sub nom., 140 S. Ct. 2717 (2020); First Choice Chiropractic, LLC v. DeWine, 969 F.3d 675, 682 n. 3
(6th Cir. 2020) (“Sorrell neither delineated a new test nor modified the Central Hudson test.”); 1-800411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir. 2014) (“The upshot [of Sorrell]
is that when a court determines commercial speech restrictions are content- or speaker-based, it should
then assess their constitutionality under Central Hudson.”); Greater Phila. Chamber of Com. V. City
of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116, 139 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)
(“Sorrell merely stands for the proposition that some level of scrutiny above rational basis review
applied . . . Sorrell references a ‘heightened scrutiny,’ but it is just as likely that this is the same as
intermediate scrutiny, which is stricter than rational basis scrutiny.”).
378. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Conway, No. 3:13–CV–00229–CRS, 2014 WL
2618579, at *7–12 (W.D. Ky. June 12, 2014); Rubenstein v. Fla. Bar, 72 F. Supp. 3d 1298, 1310–
18 (S.D. Fla. 2014); Moore-King v. Cnty. Of Chesterfield, 819 F. Supp. 2d 604, 619–21 (E.D. Va.
2011); Paramount Contractors and Devs., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 805 F. Supp. 2d 977, 988–97
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essentially substituted one of Central Hudson’s pre-Sorrell progeny for
Sorrell as a focal point of analysis.379 A variation on this phenomenon has
seen a few courts liberally sprinkle their opinions with citations drawn
from this line of cases.380 Finally, some courts have acknowledged Sorrell
but sidestepped the question of its impact by ruling that the restriction at
issue would fail even under Central Hudson’s intermediate regime.381
B. A Categorical Exemption from Reed?
Though the prescription in Reed v. Town of Gilbert382 of strict
scrutiny for content-based restrictions literally supersedes Central

(C.D. Cal. 2011); ABCDE Operating, LLC v. Snyder, No. 11–11426, 2011 WL 3113797, at *4 (E.D.
Mich. July 26, 2011); Steiner v. Superior Ct., 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 155, 1488–90 (Ct. App. 2013);
McKinley v. Abbott, No. A–09–CV–643–LY, 2013 WL 12233435, at *5 (W.D. Texas Sept. 26, 2013);
Keyoni Enters., LLC v. Cnty. Of Maui, 2015 WL 1470847, at *5–6 (D. Haw. March 30, 2015); La.
Cleaning Sys, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, No. 16-0014, 2016 WL 6818523, at *3 (W.D. La. Nov. 17,
2016); La. Cleaning Sys., Inc. v. City of Shreveport, No. 16-0014, 2019 WL 4780823 (W.D. La. Sept.
30, 2019); Authentic Beverages Co., Inc. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 835 F. Supp. 2d 227,
240–41 (W.D. Tex. 2011); Rocket Learning, Inc. v. Rivera-Sanchez, 715 F.3d 1, 13–14 (1st
Cir. 2013); AEP Tex. Com. & Indus. Retail Ltd. P’ship v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 436 S.W.3d
890, 923–24 (Tex. App. 2014); Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 368 P.3d 1131, 1149–50 (Mont.
2016); Flying Dog Brewery, LLLP v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm’n, 597 Fed. Appx. 342, 355 (6th
Cir. 2015); PHN Motors, LLC v. Medina Township, 498 Fed. Appx. 540, 545 (6th Cir. 2012); Karraa
v. City of Lost Angeles, No. 2:20-cv-07036-SVW-AGRx, 2020 WL 6882947 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9,
2020).
379. Aptive Env’t, LLC v. Town of Castle Rock, 959 F.3d 961, 981–82 (10th Cir. 2020) (finding
outcome “dictated by” City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993)); Sharona
Prop., L.L.C. v. Orange Village, 92 F. Supp. 3d 672, 682 (N.D. Ohio 2015) (describing Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) as “the most informative case” on the topic at issue);
City of Corona v. AMG Outdoor Advert., Inc., 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 572–73 (Ct. App. 2016)
(adhering to Metromedia); Stardust, 3007 LLC v. City of Brookhaven, 1:14-CV-03534-ELR, 2016
WL 11544441, at *15 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2016) (stating that the issue in the case was “strikingly
similar” to one addressed by the Court in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)); Lamar
Tenn., LLC v. City of Knoxville, No. E2014–02055–COA–R3–CV, 2016 WL 746503, at *16 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2016) (quoting passages from Lorillard for proper formulation of Central Hudson’s
third and fourth steps); Second Amend. Arms v. City of Chicago, 135 F.Supp.3d 743, 757–58 (N.D.
Ill. 2015) (looking to Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999),
for interpretation of Central Hudson’s third and fourth steps); Kiser v. Kamdar, 831 F.3d 784, 789 (6th
Cir. 2016) (quoting extensively from Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993)).
380. See, e.g., Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 92 (3d Cir. 2014); Safelite Grp., Inc. v. Rothman,
229 F. Supp. 3d 859, 880 (D. Minn. 2017).
381. Educ. Media Co. at Va. Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 2013); Valle Del
Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 821 (9th Cir. 2013); Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d
1228, 1235 n.7 (11th Cir. 2017); 1-800-411-Pain Referral Service, LLC v. Tollefson, 915 F. Supp. 2d
1032, 1050 (D. Minn. 2012); Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 826, 839–40 (M.D.
Tenn. 2013); see also United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164–68 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that the
prohibition failed under Sorrell’s heightened scrutiny and, in the alternative, under Central Hudson).
382. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015).
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Hudson,383 this construction has thus far been widely rejected by courts.384
Reed itself affords substantial latitude for inferring that its facially
comprehensive rule of strict scrutiny for content-based restraints was not
intended to eliminate intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech. The
case involved a limitation on noncommercial expression,385 and the
Court’s opinion did not mention Central Hudson—or, for that matter,
commercial speech. Absent an explicit directive by the Court, lower courts
have by and large assumed that Reed had not intended such wholesale
preemption of existing commercial speech doctrine. Instead, they have
generally applied the premise that commercial speech remains within
Central Hudson’s compass.
Following Reed, many courts considering commercial speech
regulations have acknowledged the Court’s holding in Reed but denied
that it affected Central Hudson. As one court succinctly put it,
“The Reed majority did not discuss Central Hudson, let alone purport to
overrule it.”386 Other courts have affirmed Central Hudson’s continued
relevance in similarly direct terms.387 Somewhat more subtly, but still
383. See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text.
384. Dan V. Kozlowski & Derigan Silver, Measuring Reed’s Reach: Content Discrimination in
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 24 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 191, 193
(2019) (“[T]he courts of appeals have thus far declined to apply Reed to categories of speech that have
traditionally been less protected, such as commercial speech.”).
385. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text.
386. Adams Outdoor Advert. V. City of Madison, 17-cv-576-jdp, 2020 WL 1689705, at *12
(W.D. Wis. April 7, 2020); see also Cal. Outdoor Equity Partners v. City of Corona, No. CV 1503172, 2015 WL 4163346, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2015) (“Reed does not
concern commercial speech, let alone bans on off-site billboards. The fact that Reed has no bearing on
this case is abundantly clear from the fact that Reed does not even cite Central Hudson, let alone apply
it.”).
387. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 2084CV01954-BLS2, 2021 WL
1147444, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2021) (internal citation omitted) (“‘Reed does not disturb
the Court’s longstanding framework for commercial speech under Central Hudson.’ . . . The Court
may not ignore Central Hudson and its progeny on the theory that they were implicitly overruled by
Reed.”); Peterson v. Village of Downers Grove, 150 F. Supp. 3d 910, 928 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“[A]bsent
an express overruling of Central Hudson, which most certainly did not happen in Reed, lower courts
must consider Central Hudson and its progeny—which are directly applicable to the commercialbased distinctions at issue in this case—binding.”); Boelter v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 192 F. Supp.
3d 427, 447 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Reed, 576 U.S. at 163–64) (“Although the Supreme Court
has recently reiterated that content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny review, it has not
explicitly overturned the decades of jurisprudence holding that commercial speech, and speech like
it—which, inherently, requires a content-based distinction—warrants less First Amendment
protection.”); Lamar Cent. Outdoor, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 199 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 631 (Ct. App.
2016) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (“Reed does not concern commercial speech,
and therefore does not disturb the framework which holds that commercial speech is subject only to
intermediate scrutiny as defined by the Central Hudson test.”); Contest Promotions, LLC v. City &
Cnty. Of S.F., 874 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 827 F.3d 1192, 1198 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016)) (“We have . . . rejected the notion that Reed altered
Central Hudson’s longstanding intermediate scrutiny framework.”); RCP Publ’ns Inc. v. City of
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unmistakably, a few courts have recited Reed’s ruling but then simply
proceeded to apply Central Hudson.388 In some instances, courts have
avoided the issue of Reed’s impact on Central Hudson by finding
resolution of the question unnecessary to deciding the case.389 Perhaps
most strikingly, numerous courts have omitted altogether mention of Reed
from their analyses of commercial speech regulations.390 A few recent
Chicago, 204 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (“This [c]ourt . . . does not see Reed as
overturning the Supreme Court’s consistent jurisprudence subjecting commercial speech regulations
to a lesser degree of judicial scrutiny.”); CTIA–The Wireless Assoc. v. City of Berkeley, 139 F. Supp.
3d 1048, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The Supreme Court has clearly made a distinction between
commercial speech and noncommercial speech, see, e.g., Central Hudson . . . and nothing in its recent
opinions, including Reed, even comes close to suggesting that that well-established distinction is no
longer valid.”); Geft Outdoor LLC v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1016–17
(S.D. Ind. 2016) (“Since Reed did not pertain to commercial speech and omitted any mention of
Central Hudson and its progeny . . . [we] hold that . . . Reed does not change the controlling
precedent.”); Mass. Ass’n of Priv. Career Schs. V. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 173, 192 (D. Mass. 2016)
(indicating approval of other courts’ conclusion that Reed “does not disturb the Court’s longstanding
framework for commercial speech under Central Hudson.”); S.F. Apartment Ass’n v. City & Cnty.
Of S.F., 142 F. Supp. 3d 910, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Reed is inapplicable to the present
case . . . [because] it does not concern commercial speech. Restrictions on commercial speech are
evaluated under Central Hudson”); Citizens for Free Speech, LLC v. County of Alameda, 114 F. Supp.
3d 952, 968–69 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“Reed has no
applicability to the issues before the Court . . . . [Because the statute at issue] only applies to
commercial speech, the Court must examine that provision under intermediate scrutiny, not strict
scrutiny.”); Reagan Nat’l Advert. Of Austin, Inc. v. City of Cedar Park, 387 F. Supp. 3d 703, 712
(W.D. Tex. 2019) (“Reed does not require the application of strict scrutiny to content-based
regulations of commercial speech.”).
388. See, e.g., Centro De La Comunidad Hispana De Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 128
F. Supp. 3d 597, 613 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); Vugo, Inc. v. City of New York, 931 F.3d 42, 49 n.6 (2d Cir.
2019).
389. See, e.g., Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1235 n.7 (11th Cir. 2017)
(“[I]n Reed, the Court arguably broadened the test for determining whether a law is content based . . . .
We need not wade into these troubled waters, however, because the State cannot survive Central
Hudson scrutiny.”); People v. Martinez, 273 Cal. Rptr. 3d 505, 526 (Ct. App. 2020) (“We ultimately
find it unnecessary to resolve whether [the challenged law] regulates commercial speech,
noncommercial speech, or both because even under the level of scrutiny applicable to commercial
speech, the section does not pass constitutional muster.”); Timilsina v. W. Valley City, 121 F. Supp.
3d 1205, 1215 (D. Utah 2015) (“Because the parties agree this case concerns commercial speech
and . . . Central Hudson applies, the Court need not address how the regulation would fare under the
recent Supreme Court case, Reed v. Town of Gilbert.”).
390. See, e.g., Art and Antique Dealers League of Am., Inc. v. Seggos, No. 18 Civ. 2504 (LGS),
2021 WL 848196, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2021); Karraa v. City of Los Angeles, No. 2:20-cv07036-SVW-AGRx, 2020 WL 6882947 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2020); RCP Publ’ns Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 304 F. Supp. 3d 729, 736–41 (N.D. Ill. 2018); First Choice Chiropractic, LLC v. DeWine,
969 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2020); Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 368 P.3d 1131, 1149–50 (Mont.
2016); FTC v. Agora Fin., LLC, No. 1:19-cv-3100-SAG, 2020 WL 998734, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 2,
2020); ACA Connects – America’s Commc’ns Ass’n v. Frey, 471 F. Supp. 3d 318, 326–29 (D. Me.
July 7, 2020); Kole v. Village of Norridge, No. 11 C 3871, 2017 WL 5128989, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
06, 2017); La. Cleaning Sys., Inc. v. City of Shreveport, No. 16-0014, 2016 WL 6818523, at *3 (W.D.
La. Nov. 17, 2016); Tracy Rifle and Pistol LLC v. Harris, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1185 (E.D. Cal.
2015); Kiser v. Kamdar, 831 F.3d 784, 788–89 (6th Cir. 2016); Mo. Broad. Ass’n v. Schmitt, 946 F.3d
453, 462–63 (8th Cir. 2020); Bevan & Assocs., LPA, Inc. v. Yost, 929 F.3d 366, (6th Cir. 2019);
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decisions have invoked Reed to strike down regulations affecting
commercial speech, but these have occurred in a particular context
reminiscent of Reed’s specific facts: disparate treatment of billboards
applicable to both commercial and noncommercial speech.391 At this point,
they amount to a limited enclave within the general application of Central
Hudson. Thus, whatever the theoretical or semantic case for categorically
extending Reed’s strict scrutiny for content-based restrictions to
commercial speech, this view will prevail only by the Supreme Court
rejecting lower courts’ overwhelming construction of Reed.
C. Persistence of the Gentler Central Hudson
As previously discussed, the Court’s formal adherence to Central
Hudson’s characterization as an intermediate form of scrutiny is arguably
belied by the test’s repeated, rigorous application to invalidate commercial
speech limitations.392 At the same time, however, the Court has not
disavowed the more lenient interpretation of the test as articulated in
Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox393 and quoted
or paraphrased in cases such as City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network,
Inc.,394 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States,395
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,396 and Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.397
Whether the Court has deliberately reserved this less severe version of
Central Hudson to uphold restrictions it finds benign is not known.
Whatever the reason, though, lower courts have often relied on this
approach in sustaining commercial speech regulations.398
The relatively permissive tenor of Fox’s articulation of the review
prescribed for commercial speech restrictions is unmistakable:

Lamar Advantage GP Co., LLC v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-180675, 2020 WL 3273253, at *9–10
(Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 2020); Express Oil Change, L.L.C. v. Miss. Bd. Of Licensure for Prof’l Eng’r.
& Surveyors, 916 F.3d 483, 492–93 (5th Cir. 2019); Bank of Hope v. Miye Chon, 938 F.3d 389, 396–
97 (3d Cir. 2019); Strict Scrutiny Media, Co. v. City of Reno, 290 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1157–58 (D.
Nev. 2017); Garey v. James S. Farrin, P.C., 1:16cv542, 2019 WL 7037606, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 20,
2019); City of Corona v. AMG Outdoor Advert., Inc., 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563, 572–73 (Ct. App. 2016);
Greater Phila. Chamber of Com. V. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116, 137–38 (3d Cir. 2020); Second
Amend. Arms v. City of Chicago, 135 F. Supp. 3d 743, 755–58 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
391. See Int’l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy, 974 F.3d 690, 707–08 (6th Cir. 2020); Reagan Nat’l
Advert., Inc. v. City of Austin, 972 F.3d 696, 702–09 (5th Cir. 2020); GEFT Outdoor, L.L.C. v. City
of Westfield, 491 F. Supp. 3d 387, 404 (S.D. Ind. 2020).
392. See supra Section II.C.
393. Bd. Of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); see supra notes 61–63.
394. Cincinati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416 n.12 (1993).
395. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999).
396. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001).
397. Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995).
398. See supra notes 389–94.
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What our decisions require is a “fit” between the legislature’s ends
and the means chosen to accomplish those ends—a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the
single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the
interest served, that employs not necessarily the least restrictive
means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental
decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be
employed.399

The Court’s ruling in Fox—allowing a state university’s ban on the
operation of private commercial enterprises on campus—flowed naturally
if not inevitably from this forgiving standard.
Portions of this passage have been a mainstay of lower court opinions
determining that the regulation in question passes muster under Central
Hudson.400 Adaptations of Fox’s formulation in Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting,401 Discovery Network,402 Lorillard,403 and Went For It404
have likewise been invoked to sustain restrictions that might not have met
more demanding interpretations of Central Hudson. Some courts have also
pointed to a separate portion of the Went For It opinion to relieve the
government of an onerous burden of proof:
[W]e do not read our [First Amendment] case law to require that
empirical data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background
information . . . . [W]e have permitted litigants to justify speech
restrictions by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to
different locales altogether, or even, in a case applying strict

399. Bd. Of Trs. V. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (internal citation and some quotation marks
omitted).
400. See, e.g., Greater Phila. Chamber of Com. V. City of Philadelphia, 949 F.3d 116, 154 n.283
(3d Cir. 2020); Bellion Spirits, LLC v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 3d 5, 26 (D.D.C 2019); McKinley
v. Abbott, No. A–09–CV–643–LY, 2013 WL 12233435, at *7 (W.D. Tex., Sept. 26, 2013); Bulldog
Invs. Gen. P’ship. V. Sec. of the Commonwealth, 953 N.E.2d 691, 711 (Mass. 2011).
401. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999); see also
Adams Outdoor Advert. V. City of Madison, 17-cv-576-jdp, 2020 WL 1689705, at *16 (W.D. Wis.
April 7, 2020); Second Amend. Arms v. City of Chi, 135 F. Supp. 3d 743, 758 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Bulldog
Invs. Gen. P’ship., 953 N.E.2d at 711.
402. See Cincinati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.3 (1993); see also Sharona
Prop., L.L.C. v. Orange Village, 92 F. Supp. 3d 672, 682 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
403. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001); see also Greater Phila.
Chamber of Com., 949 F.3d at 154 n.282.
404. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995); see also Vivint La. V. City of
Shreveport, 213 F. Supp. 3d 821, 824–25, 828–29 (W.D. La. 2016); RCP Publ’ns Inc. v. City of Chi,
304 F. Supp. 3d 729, 735–36 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
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scrutiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and
simple common sense.405

Moreover, a substantial number of arguably flawed restraints on
commercial speech have been upheld under Central Hudson even without
relying on these government-friendly pronouncements.406
Until the Supreme Court expressly repudiates its more flexible
rendition of Central Hudson, many courts appear willing to employ it to
uphold commercial speech restrictions that strike them as reasonable. Nor
does the Court seem inexorably on course to wholly discard the more
indulgent review represented by Fox. Practical reasons exist for even a
Court bent on dismantling much commercial regulation to retain the option
of applying this version of the test.407 Whether it does so, of course,
remains to be seen.
D. Restraints on Deregulation
As earlier discussed, the potential for harsh First Amendment
scrutiny of content-based regulation broadly defined has raised the specter
of resurrecting the Lochner era.408 However, even a Court with a decidedly
pro-business tilt409 might refrain from taking this approach to its logical
extreme. Concerns about the Court’s institutional legitimacy may dampen
an impulse to pursue the wholesale overthrow of settled expectations
regarding the reach of the regulatory state. Moreover, such an agenda
would not invariably be favored by the interests on whose behalf it was
conducted, for some business interests prefer the stability and protection
provided by government regulation.410

405. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 628 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also
Greater Phila. Chamber of Com., 949 F.3d at 143 (3d Cir. 2020); S.F. Apartment Ass’n v. City &
Cnty. Of S.F., 142 F. Supp. 3d 910, 924 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
406. See, e.g., City of Corona v. AMG Outdoor Advert., Inc., E068313, 2019 WL 643474, at
*8–10 (Feb. 15, 2019 Cal. Ct. App.); N.J. Dep’t of Labor & Workforce Dev. V. Crest Ultrasonics, 82
A.3d 258, 267–72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014); Paramount Contractors and Devs., Inc. v. City of
L.A., 805 F. Supp. 2d 977, 988–1001 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Kansas City Premier Apartments, Inc. v. Mo.
Real Est. Comm’n, 344 S.W.3d 160, 168–69 (Mo. 2011); Demarest v. City of Leavenworth, 876 F.
Supp. 2d 1186, 1199–1202 (E.D. Wash. 2012); Art & Antique Dealers League of Am., Inc. v. Seggos,
No. 18 Civ. 2504 (LGS), 2021 WL 848196, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2021).
407. See infra Section III.D.
408. See supra Section II.D.
409. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, When It Comes to Business, the
Right and Left Sides of the Court Agree, 54 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 33, 48 (2017) (“What with the left
and right side of the bench favoring business at levels unprecedented in the last 70 years, it is fair to
characterize the Roberts Court as ‘pro-business.’”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age
Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 962 (2008) (“The Roberts Court is the most pro-business Court of any
since the mid-1930s.”).
410. See infra notes 415–16 and accompanying text.
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The scale of disruption unleashed by far-ranging skeptical review of
government constraints on communication in commercial relations411
might well give pause to even the most ardent judicial champion of a
deregulatory First Amendment. Even a limited sampling of presumed
targets of strict scrutiny offers a glimpse of massive upheaval of the
regulatory landscape, such as “[laws] that require nutritional labels,
disclosure of information related to securities, Truth in Lending Act
disclosures, disclosures in prescription drug advertisements, warnings for
pregnant women on alcoholic beverages, airplane safety information, and
required exit signs.”412 And these examples involve only disclosures.
Requiring the government to demonstrate that a restriction on commercial
speech is necessary to achieve a compelling interest could place under a
cloud a whole other multitude of laws designed to protect consumers from
harm or fraud. The impact of such a First Amendment sword on widely
accepted requirements and prohibitions would vastly exceed the “farreaching” consequences Justice Rehnquist warned of in his Virginia State
Board dissent.413 The magnitude of these effects could provoke a backlash
that includes proposals to alter the role or composition of the Court. Even
in the absence of pervasive invalidation of regulation through the First
Amendment, measures to offset the more conservative direction of the
Court arising from recent changes in personnel have been seriously
advanced. 414
Further, even assuming the Court is inclined to serve business
interests, some may doubt whether a comprehensive deregulatory project
best advances this agenda. Industries often find that the stability and
predictability of a definite regulatory framework outweigh the costs that it
imposes.415 History furnishes examples of regulation that ostensibly reins

411. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
412. Shanor, supra note 186, at 192.
413. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s opinion the way will be open not only for dissemination
of price information but for active promotion of prescription drugs, liquor, cigarettes, and other
products the use of which it has previously been thought desirable to discourage.”).
414. See Jeannie Suk Gersen, What the Democrats Achieve by Threatening to Pack the Supreme
Court, NEW YORKER (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/whatdemocrats-achieve-by-threatening-to-pack-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/V6US-US2P]
(“Democrats certainly can’t undo Barrett’s appointment to the Court, but with the expectation of being
able to wield power soon, they have stepped up a discussion of ‘court-packing,’ in order to undermine
a 6–3 conservative majority that otherwise may be entrenched for a generation.”); Amber Phillips,
What Is Court Packing, and Why Are Some Democrats Seriously Considering It?, WASH. POST (Oct.
7, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/22/packing-supreme-court/
[https://perma.cc/4DNX-E4N2].
415. See, e.g., The Times Editorial Board, Editorial: Even Car Companies Aren’t Going Along
with Trump’s Rollback of Mileage and Emissions Standards, L.A. TIMES (July 26, 2019),
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in corporate abuse but is actually thought congenial by the affected
business.416 In Janus, Justice Kagan voiced the apprehension that the
Court’s path of deploying the First Amendment to dismantle what it
considered noxious regulation “runs long.”417 It could, but pragmatism
may limit its theoretical reach. Even the original Lochner era did not come
close to an all-out assault on regulation of business, as the Court left most
challenged laws intact.418 It would be premature to assume that today’s
Justices will wield the First Amendment to indiscriminately reject any
regulation they would not have supported as lawmakers.
E. NIFLA’s Limited Impact
As previously described, the Court’s ruling in NIFLA419 infused the
test for compelled commercial speech with unprecedented teeth.420 It is too
soon to know whether the decision signaled a wider attack on disclosure
requirements as part of the Court’s deregulatory application of the First
Amendment. If it did, then it is possible this development would
osmotically tighten the Court’s scrutiny of restrictions on commercial
speech under Central Hudson. After all, the Court’s review of commercial
speech limitations has long been considered more stringent than that of
required disclaimers and disclosures.421
As evidenced by the lower courts’ responses to NIFLA thus far,
broad-scale erosion of government power to compel commercial speech
has not yet materialized. Rather, the predominant approach has been to
acknowledge NIFLA’s bearing on the doctrine of compelled speech while

https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-07-25/california-carmakers-fuel-economy-trump
[https://perma.cc/TVT4-4YC3] (“Car companies want the certainty of one national standard.”).
416. See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877–1916, at 34–39
(Greenwood Press 1976) (1965) (describing eagerness of railroads for federal regulation to relieve the
instability and financial losses resulting from unrestrained competition); JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE
CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900–1918, at 47 (1968) (reporting that 95% of employers
surveyed by National Association of Manufacturers’ 1910 questionnaire favored worker
compensation).
417. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501–02 (2018)
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
418. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR
REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 2 (2001) (“Lochnerism
was never consistently practiced. Even at the height of the Lochner era, from 1923 to 1934, federal
and state courts upheld the vast majority of challenged regulations.”); Charles Warren, The
Progressivesness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 294–95 (1913) (finding
that of more than 560 decisions based on the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause between 1887
and 1911, the Court struck down a state law “involving a social or economic question of the kind
included under the phrase ‘social justice’ legislation” only twice other than in Lochner v. New York).
419. Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
420. See supra Section II.E.
421. See Murphy, Bernstein & Fryska, supra note 339 and accompanying text.
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still applying the test of Zauderer422 in its traditionally permissive423
version. Perhaps the most notable example is the Ninth Circuit’s
disposition of a Berkeley ordinance requiring cell phone companies to
inform potential buyers that carrying a cell phone could cause them to
exceed FCC guidelines for exposure to radio-frequency radiation.424 Two
years earlier, the court had denied a trade association’s request for a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the ordinance.425 On appeal,
the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s opinion and remanded the
case for consideration in light of NIFLA.426 Undissuaded by this
instruction, the Ninth Circuit upheld the requirement again under
Zauderer.427
While
recognizing
“NIFLA‘s
clarification
of
the Zauderer framework,”428 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the features
of California’s law that proved fatal in NIFLA were absent from
Berkeley’s ordinance.429
While the Ninth Circuit has been the most conspicuous advocate of
Zauderer’s post-NIFLA relevance, it has not been an outlier. An Oklahoma
federal district court pointed to NIFLA only to lift a portion of that opinion
that could be read to support application of Zauderer’s more lenient
scrutiny.430 Likewise, the D.C. District Court upheld an agency’s rule
requiring that hospitals publish their standard charges and found nothing
in NIFLA precluding analysis of the requirement under Zauderer.431 A
West Virginia federal district court did discuss NIFLA in the course of
striking down a restriction on lawyer advertising, but it ultimately found
the disclosure invalid under both Zauderer and NIFLA.432

422. Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
423. See supra notes 339–51 and accompanying text.
424. CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 928 F.3d 832, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2019).
425. CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1124 (9th Cir. 2017).
426. CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018) (mem.).
427. CTIA, 928 F.3d at 841–49.
428. Id. at 837.
429. See id. at 844–45.
430. See Upton’s Nats. Co. v. Stitt, No. CIV-20-938-F, 2020 WL 6808784, at *2 (W.D. Okla.
Nov. 19, 2020) (citing Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018))
(“While the First Amendment’s protection is broad, the Supreme Court has recognized that it has
‘applied a lower level of scrutiny to laws that compel disclosures in certain contexts,’ including cases
analyzing the disclosure of ‘factual, noncontroversial information in . . . commercial speech.’” (some
internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at *5 (“[T]he court finds[, applying Zauderer,] that the
disclosure requirement is reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing confusion or deception
of consumers.”).
431. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 468 F. Supp. 3d 372, 391–92 (D.D.C. 2020).
432. Recht v. Justice, No. 5:20-CV-90, 2020 WL 6109430, at *6 (N.D. W. Va. June 26, 2020).

704

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:647

CONCLUSION
It is tempting to dismiss the Central Hudson test as a relic made
obsolete by the Court’s steady dismantling of commercial regulation
through the First Amendment. Developments of the past decade support
the impression that it is only a matter of time before the Court formally
abandons this standard. Nevertheless, Central Hudson’s persistence—
especially its pervasive application by lower courts—suggests that it
serves a valuable function even as its interpretation has varied and its
relevance questioned. However imperfect, it provides a framework to
mediate the tension between government’s far-reaching power to regulate
economic activity and recognition that, as communication, commercial
speech implicates the First Amendment.433
Central Hudson’s lack of precision and predictability hardly renders
it unique—or even distinctive—in First Amendment jurisprudence. Free
speech doctrine is replete with standards and concepts that are not
susceptible to mechanical application—limited public figure,434
incitement,435 overbreadth,436 public forum,437 and symbolic speech,438 to
name a few. However sound or coherent their theoretical foundations,
these too can be applied with varying solicitude to expression according
to courts’ judgment and predilections. Still, each provides an enduring
construct whose flexibility accommodates changing conditions and
shifting majorities without having to overturn the underlying structure. In
a jurisprudence that prizes stare decisis, such stability has much to
recommend it.

433. Even a prominent critic who finds the test overly protective of commercial speech has stated
that it can “be subject to principled revision.” Post, supra note 130, at 56.
434. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (describing plaintiffs deemed
limited public figures in defamation suits as “hav[ing] thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved”).
435. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (States may not “forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”).
436. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted) (“[A] governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.”).
437. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983)
(prescribing different standards for public property “which the state has opened for use by the public
as a place for expressive activity” and that “which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication”).
438. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (“[W]hen ‘speech’ and
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct . . . a government regulation is
sufficiently justified . . . if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression[] and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”).
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That the Central Hudson test has perhaps been applied with greater
stringency than was originally envisioned does not demand its abolition.
The Court’s current deregulatory bent may prompt it to further limit
government’s ability to constrain commercial speech. Central Hudson’s
proven receptivity to more generous conceptions of power, however,
affords a safety net should the present experiment produce disturbing
unintended consequences. Meanwhile, lower courts “on the ground” can
continue to strike a balance between the imperatives of practical
governance and a baseline protection of commercial speech from which
even liberal Justices have shown no sign of retreating. Ultimately, a future
Court of different orientation may draw from this experience to assign
greater weight to regulatory priorities. Should this change in philosophy
occur, Central Hudson ensures that it will require no drastic upheaval in
the law.

